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ABSTRACT: In the United States, where government policies have resulted in
extremely high incarceration rates, parental incarceration is a prevalent,
distinct, and severe form of childhood disadvantage. Children who lose their
parents to incarceration suffer unique harms, which are not addressed by
current social insurance programs. In particular, an inmate's child suffers direct
financial harm from losing financial and in-kind support, from diversion of
household resources to the incarcerated inmate parent, and from deficits in
future contributions due to the parent's ex-felon status. Children of incarcerated
parents tend to already be poor, and these additional deprivations create
severely negative consequences for their welfare. This Article proposes that the
state should provide children with incarceration insurance: an upfront subsidy
to the child whose parent goes to prison, to be repaid to the state by the
incarcerated parent on a deferred basis in lieu of child support. The state should
supply this social insurance program because of its interest and obligation in
promoting child welfare and enforcing parental responsibility. The United
States in particular has a strong obligation to the children who bear hidden
costs of the government's choice to pursue an aggressive criminal punishment
regime that disproportionately harms poor and minority children. This proposal
is an innovative departure from the status quo, which does little to support
children while allowing child support arrears to accrue against inmate parents.
The proposal allows for a menu of implementation options that states can
choose from to fit their own circumstances and needs. A baseline version of the
proposal engages with the question of how to assign family responsibility, legal
and philosophical inquiries about desert, and how to mitigate the impact of
localized disadvantage on broader society. The resulting policy regime thus
must support the basic motivations behind the proposal: to plug a resource gap
and thus promote child welfare, especially for disadvantaged children, to
maintain the bonds of parental obligation while incarceration forces physical
removal, and to propel the state to neutralize the effects of its own role in
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driving up parental incarceration for disadvantaged children. Doing so will
allow both the parent and the state to internalize some collateral costs of mass
incarceration currently borne by innocent third parties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
People exit their parental obligations for many reasons, legitimate and
illegitimate. 1 In an ideal world, parents stay to provide continuity of support for
their children at the expense of some other pursuit: a new life, a new spouse, a
new family. In the real world, of course, some parents choose to leave for
precisely those ordinary reasons. But there is another form of parental exit. This
exit is not as obviously a matter of choice, and it is becoming more and more
prevalent.
This exit is the American prison system.2 It is the door through which
many American children see their parents leave. In 2008, 2.6 million 3 children
I. See ANNE ALSTOTT, No EXIT 40 (2004).
2. Throughout this paper I will refer to the word "prison" to include both inmates in prisons but
also in jails. There are important distinctions between these two penal institutions, but for the purpose of
evaluating risks to children of incarcerated parents, those distinctions are not central.
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in America-3.5 percent of the total minor population4--had incarcerated
parents. Around seventy percent of these children were children of color.
5
Accordingly, the risk of parental incarceration is staggeringly high for African-
American children. A black child born in 1990 has a one in four chance of
having her father incarcerated by the time she turns fourteen.6 If her father is
also a high school dropout, the risk of parental incarceration is over fifty
percent.
Incarceration imposes myriad collateral consequences upon inmates, their
families and associates, and society at large. In this Article, I focus on the
concrete, financial aspect of parental incarceration's damage to children.
8
When the parent of a child goes to prison, the child may lose parental income
for basic material needs. The family's remaining income may be redirected to
support the incarcerated parent. The child loses his parent's physical care,
guidance through education and socialization, and representation of interests in
the broader community.9 When parents go to prison, the real consequences for
their children, many of whom are already disadvantaged, are severe. Hunger
and other forms of marked material deprivation are not uncommon. t0 These
and other impacts of incarceration lead children and other family members to
feel as if they are "doing time" with the inmate. I I
Parental incarceration is a prevalent, distinct, and severe form of childhood
disadvantage in the United States. Though the government provides some
protections against other forms of parental exits in setting up social insurance
and social welfare programs, none target the specific disadvantages conferred
3. BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK PROGRESS 83
(2012) (extrapolating from other studies the number of children under age 18 with a parent in prison or
jail in 2008). Another estimate of children with parents in either jail or prison is 2.4 million. NELL
BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE WORLD 2 (2005) (citing correspondence with Christopher Mumola, a
statistician at the Bureau of Justice Statistics).
4. There were 74.1 million American children ages 0 to 17 in 2008. Child Population (Table),
FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, http://www.childstats.gov/
americaschildren/tables/popl.asp?popup=true (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
5. Sarah Schirmer et al., , Incarcerated Parents and Their Children: Trends 1991-2007, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT 7 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/
inc-incarceratedparents.pdf.
6. Christopher Wildeman, Parental Imprisonment, the Prison Boom, and the Concentration of
Childhood Disadvantage, 46 DEMOGRAPHY 265, 270-71 (2009).
7. Id. at 266. At any given point in time, 7% of black children and 0.8% of white children have a
parent in prison. Id.
8. See TODD A. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES 130 (2007) (noting the importance that
families of incarcerated inmates place on financial losses). For an overview of other types of collateral
consequences of prisons, see Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia, American Prisons, in PRISONS (Michael
Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
9. As Donald Braman points out, these effects are "particularly devastating to poor families because
they generally have the highest marginal costs ... any additional expenses or burdens cut closer to the
bone." DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN
AMERICA 158 (2004).
10. See CLEAR, supra note 8, at 131.
I1. See BRAMAN, supra note 9.
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by parental incarceration itself. Children of incarcerated parents are thus left
with little recourse. That so many American children lose parents to the prison
system is a "national tragedy"'2 because when a parent goes to prison, children
lose a critical source of support that is not made up in any other way. Children
themselves are blameless in this tragedy. No matter how we conceptualize the
parents' culpability, children do not direct their parents' conduct or, indeed,
choose their parents. Yet all children need physical goods, emotional support,
education, and adequate representation of their interests.
In our society, we expect parents to act as the primary provider of most of
these resources. But when reality falls short of that expectation, an alternate
plan should kick in. In the face of that reality, the state should strike a balance
between parental incapacitation and parental responsibility in its effort to
provide for children's needs. I contend that although some parents make a
deliberate choice in breaking the law, the state also bears considerable
responsibility for the consequences of incarcerating these parents, which are
often borne by their children. Children should be understood as persons of
special concern to the state because it has a special obligation to them, because
investing in child welfare results in positive social returns, and because the
state in particular has an obligation to children of incarcerated parents, who
bear hidden costs of the government's particularly aggressive criminal
punishment regime. In accord with ideals of equal opportunity and fundamental
fairness, then, children whose parents are incarcerated need and deserve
incarceration insurance.
Thus, I propose a form of new social insurance, which would enlist the
state in providing children with a bulwark against the financial risk of parental
imprisonment. 13 This "incarceration insurance" requires the government to pay
a subsidy to children, perhaps subject to a maximum dollar and time restriction.
The incarcerated parents accrue obligations while in prison, and pay back to the
government through a graduated and deferred payroll tax once they are
released. The likely gap between government payments to children and parental
repayments would be funded by tax revenue.
This novel proposal for incarceration insurance would assist almost all
children of incarcerated parents. 14 Ninety-two percent of incarcerated parents
12. Julie Poehlmann & J. Mark Eddy, A Research and Intervention Agenda for Children of
Incarcerated Parents, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 319, 338 (J. Mark Eddy & Julie
Poehlmann eds., 2010) [hereinafter CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 2010].
13. This proposal does not at first glance look like traditional insurance, but from the perspective of
the child at risk, it performs the same function. See infra Part V.A for a discussion of how the proposal
can be conceptualized as social insurance.
14. One exception would be for children who are already in foster care. Only 2% of incarcerated
fathers and eleven percent of incarcerated mothers reported having children in foster care or other
agency care. A large portion of these children were already in foster care when their parents were
incarcerated. Laura M. Maruschak, Lauren E. Glaze & Christopher J. Mumola, Incarcerated Parents
and Their Children, Findings from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
PARENTS 2010, supra note 12, at 33, 42. However, this phenomenon may be growing because of an
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are fathers, and 8 percent are mothers,' 5 but mothers were much more likely to
have been the only parent living with their children before incarceration than
were the fathers (42 percent versus 17 percent).16 For inmates who were not
single parents (either noncustodial parents or coparents), their children continue
to live with the other parent but without resources from the inmate parent. On
the other hand, children who lose their sole parent to prison suffer a massive
disruption as they must transition to living with more distant family or with a
foster family. Thus, though the state sometimes provides some social insurance,
such as foster care, for children who have two parents unable to care for them,
it fails to provide for the loss of one parent to prison. In total, 84 percent of
incarcerated parents reported that their child's current caregiver is the other
parent and 15 percent reported that their child currently lives with grandparents
or other relatives. 17
Though skeptics may wonder how the removal of a "deadbeat" parent
actually harms children, social science research shows that even parents who
did not live with their children and even those who owed back child support
nonetheless contributed to their children's lives through other funds, gifts, and
care.18 In addition, the very act of separation is a form of trauma from the
perspective of the child. 19 Thus, for most parents who go to prison, their
incarceration is damaging for their children in real and tangible ways.
In the United States, mass incarceration can be aptly characterized as "a
hidden tax, one that is visited disproportionately on poor and minority
increasing tendency for the state to begin parental termination proceedings for incarcerated parents. See
Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents and the State: The Construction of a New Family Ideology, 26
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78 (2011); Caitlin Mitchell, Note, Family Integrity and Incarcerated
Parents: Bridging the Divide, 24 YALE J. L & FEMINISM 175 (2011).
15. Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, Special Report: Parents in Prison and Their Minor
Children, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2 (2008),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf Throughout this paper, I will sometimes refer to
incarcerated parents as "fathers" or "he," but only as shorthand. Though I am by no means supporting a
gender-normative view of incarcerated parents, the shorthand is sometimes necessary because much of
the empirical literature on mass incarceration focuses on men, who make up the vast majority of
inmates. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the empirical data sometimes must be limited to the
population studied.
16. Id. at 4 (providing data for state prisons). For existing studies that focus on female inmates who
were the primary and sometimes sole caregivers of their minor children, see, for example, the research
of Barbara Bloom, Christina Jose Kampfner, and Denise Johnston in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
PARENTS (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995) (hereinafter CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
PARENTS 1995). Fewer studies target the experiences of incarcerated fathers. But see ANNE NURSE,
FATHERHOOD ARRESTED: PARENTING FROM WITHIN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2002);
BRAMAN, supra note 9. There is also overlap between children with mothers and fathers in prison.
About two-thirds of children whose mothers have been arrested also had their fathers arrested.
Teenagers whose fathers have been arrested are II times more likely to have mothers who have been
arrested versus teens who have never-arrested fathers. See Susan D. Phillips, The Past as Prologue:
Parental Incarceration, Service Planning, and Intervention Development in Context, in CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS 2010, supra note 12, at 13, 16.
17. Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 5.
18. See infra Part lI.B. I and Part lI.B.5.
19. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3, 31.
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families."' 20 The incarceration insurance program I propose operates on a
universal framework but will likely have targeted effects on minority
populations; it mirrors the mass incarceration system, which is also universal in
definition but has heavily-skewed impact on minorities. As the prison boom
over the past three decades has almost been exclusively concentrated on under-
educated, disadvantaged, African-American men,21 the families who care for
children of incarcerated parents are likely to be disadvantaged as well. Thus,
the marginal support provided to children through incarceration insurance is
especially necessary.
Current legal and social systems fail children of incarcerated parents in two
ways. First, existing work (both scholarship and policy) on social insurance
largely ignores parental incarceration as a major driver of childhood
disadvantage. Skeptics may immediately wonder why a program for
incarceration insurance is needed when there are other assistance funds-such
as foster care, welfare assistance, tax credits, housing subsidies, food stamps,
and Medicaid-that benefit poor children.22 The reality is that though
disadvantaged children receive some assistance from the state, the existing
programs are neither sufficient as a general matter, nor substantially helpful for
the specific harm visited by parental incarceration, which exacerbate the harm
to children who are already poor. Programs that aim to insure children against
catastrophic events are woefully inadequate because they miss wide swaths of
the vulnerable. For example, Social Security survivor benefits protect the
dependents of working parents from the risk of income insecurity resulting
from death or disability, but it cannot help the vast majority of poor children.
23
Foster care only kicks in when both parents are unable to care for their
children, leaving out the majority of children of incarcerated parents. While
state and federal governments aggressively pursue child support order
establishment and payment,24 when the parent goes to prison, the child receives
20. BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 156.
2 1. See Bruce Western, Reentry: Reversing Mass Imprisonment, BOS. REV (July 1, 2014), ("Among
young black men who have never been to college, one in five are incarcerated, and one in three will go
to prison at some time in their lives. The intimate link between school failure and incarceration is clear
at the bottom of the education ladder where 60 percent of black, male high school dropouts will go to
prison before age thirty-five.").
22. For an overview of each of programs that ward off some of the risks of being bom into poverty,
see THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW & JOHN PAKUTKA, SOCIAL INSURANCE: AMERICA'S
NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND CONTESTED FUTURE 71-82 (2014) (describing programs such as TANF,
Earned Income Tax child credits, dependent tax exemptions, food stamps (SNAP), nutrition supplement
funding (WIC) and child health care (SCHIP)).
23. In particular, these include those bom into "single, divorced, or never-married parent
households that account for a substantial percentage of childhood poverty." MICHAEL J. GRAETZ &
JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 6 (1999).
24. The federal government has made a significant effort to increase child support enforcement
over the past 40 years. The federal government's commitment to child support enforcement includes
both funding state collection costs and setting collection thresholds for states to meet. For example, the
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305, amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 657-662, made states establish guideline numbers and withhold child support from wages of
[Vol. 26:1
2014] Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk 97
no support. Other innovative policy proposals to improve the state of poor
children have not come to fruition, and none address parental incarceration
specifically and adequately. In the absence of a more ambitious and effective
social insurance strategy, the state should strive for incarceration insurance.
Second, the criminal justice system does not adequately address children's
interests, and the child welfare system stands woefully inadequately in the face
of mass incarceration. Sociological and legal studies discuss the reign of the
American penal state by examining its implications for the labor market,25 for
the livelihoods of those who get incarcerated,26 for dynamics in hyper-policed
communities,27 for racial justice,28 and for societal safety.29 Studies that do turn
to incarcerated parents tend to focus on the emotional and behavioral effects on
inmates and their families and typically conclude with proposals to improve
access to visitation, prison parenting classes, and the like. 30 These problems
and the proposed reforms are important. However, it is difficult to parse out
just how to alleviate socio-emotional damage on a large population of
vulnerable children who are not similarly situated. The proposals on prison
policies are probably helpful, but their mandates are too narrow and too
tangential to the direct needs of children; they also ignore the major problem of
resource deprivation. The loss of financial contribution is a direct mechanism
by which parental incarceration affects children, and incarceration insurance
addresses it head-on.
In assessing these failures, I argue that the state cannot ignore its
responsibility to promote child well-being in its efforts to punish parents. It is a
fallacy to believe that "we can make things harder for parents without making
them worse for children."31 Rather, the state must fulfill its obligation to
children by providing a least-detrimental alternative.32 Incarceration insurance
does just that, by calling on both parents and the state to act on their duties
owed to children. It aims to do so thoughtfully, by recognizing the limitations
those who didn't pay. For a more detailed but concise account of the history of child support policy in
the United States prior to 1996 welfare reform, see IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT 18-31
(1992). Analysts also observe that at least a large part of the federal child support enforcement agenda is
cost recovery. See id. at 144.
25. See, e.g., Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated Is the US Labor Market? The
Penal System as a Labor Market Institution. 104 AM. J. SOC. 1030 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Western, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).
28. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010).
29. See, e.g., CLEAR, supra note 8.
30. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 260-68; Denise Johnston, Intervention, in CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS 1995, supra note 16, at 199.
31. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 144.
32. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 11 (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEFORE BEST INTERESTS]; BERNSTEIN,
supra note 3, at 259 ("When the arrest and incarceration of a parent are genuinely necessary, it remains
our responsibility to seek a 'least detrimental alternative' to take steps to protect and support children at
every step of the process, from arrest to reentry.").
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of already-disadvantaged inmates, and by balancing those limitations against
the needs of children. As a whole, the proposal should be on the agenda of legal
scholars and academics because it stems from the legal structure of mass
incarceration, and because crafting a solution requires attention both to the
complex backdrop of public benefits law and theories of legal and political
obligation.
The next section, Part II, marshals both quantitative and qualitative
empirical studies to demonstrate that parental incarceration is a pervasive,
discrete, and significant form of childhood disadvantage. It tracks the ways in
which parental incarceration creates economic and noneconomic harms,
including loss of current economic support, increased costs to families, lowered
future income, and socio-emotional damage to children. Part III argues that this
disadvantage merits societal intervention for three reasons. First, the state has a
special obligation to children, who are both morally blameless and deserving of
care. Second, the American government should rectify hidden harms to
children generally, who bear the unrealized costs of the government's
incarceration policies, and to minority children specifically, because the state
must correct for the dramatically unequal starting points for different children
as a result of discriminatory criminal law administration. Third, the state has an
obligation to address the negative societal spillover effects of parental
incarceration. Part IV explores the division of responsibility between the
parents and the state in providing for children's needs, arguing that while the
state cannot sit idle, incarcerated parents also have an obligation to pay back. It
also examines what this duty would mean for both inmate parents and non-
incarcerated parents. Part V discusses implementation options, first by situating
the proposal as an social insurance program against a backdrop of other
innovative proposals, and then by analyzing a matrix of implementation
considerations, exploring questions such as how to initiate claims, how much to
pay the children, how much the parents should pay back, timelines, prison work
considerations, and enforcement mechanisms. It addresses some
counterarguments, caveats, and the question of political and cultural feasibility.
Finally, the paper.concludes with a few observations about how we should
respond to the parental incarceration epidemic as a uniquely American
phenomenon.
II. WHY CHILDREN NEED INCARCERATION INSURANCE: THE IMPACT OF
PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON CHILD WELL-BEING
In America, parental incarceration has become a prevalent, distinct, and
severe form of childhood disadvantage. This Part provides empirical support
for each of these three claims. It is important to carefully assess the impact of
parental incarceration on children because the underlying motivation for the
[Vol. 26:1
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proposal for incarceration insurance rests on the idea that the program would
address a significant harm. Since the insurance system I propose aims to benefit
children, the analysis below also focuses on them.
A. Parental Incarceration as a New American Epidemic
Many American parents are behind bars because the United States has an
aggressive incarceration regime. America's mass imprisonment regime is
staggering. At 756 individuals per 100,000 in the population behind bars, the
United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, surpassing China,
Iraq, Cuba, and Russia.33 The American incarceration rate is several times
greater than those of Western Europe and other developed countries.34 As of
the end of 2010, 1.5 million individuals were held in prisons in the United
States.35 This high level of imprisonment is also accompanied by a rate of
prison population growth. The number of people incarcerated increased by at
least 35,000 per year from 1980 to 2000. In the "high periods" such as 1989-90,
the increase was 127,500.36 The rate has risen by 1.6 percent from 2000 to
2009.37 For American men, the risk of imprisonment rose from 1.9 percent to
6.6 percent in the period between 1974 and 1997.38
Even more striking than the sheer volume of incarceration is its
distribution. The incarceration boom in the United States since the 1970s has
hardly been an equal-opportunity amasser of prisoners.39 Nearly one-third of
black men will have been incarcerated at some point in their lives, compared to
401 in 17 white men. Black men born in the period 1965 to 1969, just before the
War on Drugs took effect, are 7 times more likely to have been incarcerated
than white men of the same cohort.4 ' When compounded with prevalent low
educational attainment, these figures become starker. For black males born
between 1965 and 1969 who dropped out of high school (which is not an
independent variable by any means), nearly 60 percent had been to prison by
33. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, Eighth Edition, KING'S COLLEGE LONDON:
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/
downloads/wppl-8th 41.pdf The figures for China are 119 per 100,000 (accounting for administrative
detention, the figure is 183), Iraq: 93, Cuba: 531, and the Russian Federation: 629.
34. Id. France had 96 in 100,000 incarcerated, Germany had 89, Canada had 116, Australia had
129, and England and Wales had 153. Id.
35. See Lauren Glaze, Correctional Population in the United States 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 3 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpusl0.pdf.
36. See MEGAN COMFORT, DOING TIME TOGETHER: LOVE AND FAMILY IN THE SHADOW OF THE
PRISON 5-6 (2008).
37. See id. at 6.
38. See Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 7 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
piuspOl .pdf.
39. See ALEXANDER, supra note 28; MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE 34-37 (2011).
40. BONCZAR, supra note 38.
41. Id.
2014]
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1999.42 On any given day, a third of black men who did not complete high
school are behind bars.43 Black women are 3 times more likely to be
incarcerated than white women.4 As Michelle Alexander observes in arguing
that mass imprisonment in the United States entrenches a racial caste system
under the guise of colorblindness, "[t]he United States imprisons a larger
percentage of its population than South Africa did at the height of apartheid"
and "three out of four black young men" are behind bars in Washington, D.C.
45
The locations that supply prisons with inmates are clustered and map onto the
46
poor, minority neighborhoods in the inner cities.
The incarcerated are not unfettered individuals. A 2010 Bureau of Justice
Statistics special report found that 52 percent of state and 63 percent of federal
prisoners reported having minor children; the prisoners had an average of two
children.47 Based on sociologists' estimates, some 3.5 percent of children in the
United States-over 2.6 million-had a parent in prison or jail in the year
2008.48 The vast majority (about 90 percent) of these children had an
incarcerated father as opposed to a mother.49
As a result, the likelihood that a child experiences parental incarceration is
high. Performing the first robust estimates of the prevalence of parental
imprisonment in populations of children, sociologist Christopher Wildeman
extrapolated the risk of parental imprisonment for black and white children
born between 1978 and 1990. For black children in 1990, the risk that a
parent would go to prison by the time they turned age 14 was more than 25
percent, versus a less than 4 percent risk for white children.51 For black
children born in 1990 to a high school dropout, the risk of having a parent
incarcerated was greater than 50 percent. On any given day, one in 10
42. See Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151 (2004).
43. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 17 (2006).
44. Incarcerated Women, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 2 (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/cc-incarceratedWomenFactsheet Sep24sp.pdf.
45. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 12.
46. Id.
47. Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 1. The findings are based on the BJS's 2004 survey on
inmates in federal and state facilities.
48. PETTIT, supra note 2.
49. Id.
50. See Wildeman, supra note 6, at 265. Other researchers have suggested other estimates. For
example, the Center for Children of Incarcerated Parents suggested a formula: ( # of incarcerated women
x 0.75 (percent of incarcerated women w/ children) ) x 2.4 (avg number of children per mom) + ( # of
incarcerated men x 0.56 (avg % of incarcerated men with children) ) x 2 (avg number of children per
incarcerated father). Cynthia Seymour, Introduction, in CHILDREN WITH PARENTS IN PRISON: CHILD
WELFARE POLICY, PROGRAM, AND PRACTICE ISSUES 489 n.1 (Cynthia Seymour & Creasie Finney
Hairston, eds., 2001).
51. Wildeman, supra note 6, at 271.
52. Id. at 277.
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African-American children has a parent incarcerated, versus one in 100 white
children. 53
The population of children exposed to parental incarceration risk is also
staggering in size and growing. The rate of growth for having a parent in prison
was 80 percent between 1991 and 2007, matching the growth rate in
incarcerated parents (79 percent). Though the peak in parental incarceration
occurred between 1991 and 1997, the next 10 years saw a steady growth pace
of 25 percent.55 The number of children with a mother in prison was up 131
percent from 1991 to 2007, versus a 77 percent growth in the number of
children with a father in prison.
56
Because the prison population in the United States is predominantly poor
and come from minority populations, and because there is a high level of intra-
racial and intra-class assortive mating, parental incarceration risk is also
skewed along racial and class dimensions. Black children are nine times more
likely to have a parent in prison than white children, and Hispanic children are
three times more likely. 57 Though the problem of parental exit through
incarceration is theoretically universal-it happens regardless if one's parent is
black or white, male or female, rich or poor-the problem's pervasiveness in
American society makes it especially worthy of exploration.
For many swaths of the already-disadvantaged children in the U.S.,
parental incarceration is a rite of passage into greater disadvantage. The
pervasiveness problem can be solved if the U.S. dramatically reduced the
number of people incarcerated and the length of time prisoners spend behind
bars. Yet any politically feasible interventions will likely proceed gradually.
Furthermore, sociologists estimate that even if we were to return instantly to
1970s levels of incarceration (100 individuals per 100,000), the effects of mass
incarceration-including deprivations for inmates' children-are likely to
linger for another generation.
58
53. Christopher Wildeman & Bruce Western, Incarceration in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 157, 162 (2010).
54. There were 945,600 children with parents in state and federal prison in 1999. By 2007 it was
1,706,600. In 1999, there were 452,500 parents in state and federal prison. By 2007 it was 809,800.
Calculations were based on statistics provided by Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 13.
55. There was a 44 percent increase in both the number of children with parents in prison and in the
number of incarcerated parents between 1991 and 1997. Between 1997, the increase was 25% for both
figures. Calculations were based on statistics provided by Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 13.
56. There were 63,900 children with a mother in state or federal prison in 1991, versus 147,400
such children by 2007. There were 881,500 children with fathers in prison in 1991, versus 1,559,200 in
2007. Calculations were based on statistics provided by Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 13.
57. Nancy G. La Vigne, Elizabeth Davies & Diana Brazzell, Broken Bonds: Understanding and
Addressing the Needs of Children with Incarcerated Parents, URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY
CENTER 2 (2008).
58. Christopher Wildeman, Presentation at the Yale University Edward Zigler Center in Child
Development & Social Policy Lecture Series (Nov. 30, 2012) (notes on file with author).
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B. Parental Incarceration as a Discrete Driver of Childhood Disadvantage
The exit of a parent due to incarceration hampers child well-being. A
common statistic asserts that these children are six times more likely to be
incarcerated themselves than their peers, though this claim is not directly
attributed to specific sources.59 Yet empirical evidence of the harm, some with
far-reaching consequences, is not difficult to find. And though the very
separation of a child from his parent might be theorized as a per se
deprivation, this proposal builds on a more concrete, empirical foundation
and identifies specific harms derived from parental incarceration.
There are least three causal paths for parental incarceration to negatively
affect childhood economic security: the loss of financial and quasi-financial
contributions while incapacitated in prison, the increased economic strain on
other caregivers while a parent is in prison, and the present value of future
losses caused by reduced labor wages when these parents get out of prison.
Parental incarceration also leads to various forms of noneconomic deprivation,
including socio-emotional and physical health damage. This section traces each
of these three economic drivers of resource deprivation in detail and provides
supporting corroboration from ethnographical and statistical studies; it then
turns to noneconomic harms. It concludes by synthesizing these causal
mechanisms and addresses counterclaims.
It is virtually impossible to compare the counterfactual results of not
having any particular parent going to prison to the reality that his child faces
when he does go.6 1 Nevertheless, there is ample empirical evidence that
children of incarcerated parents experience particular hardships not suffered by
similarly situated children whose parents were never incarcerated.62 This
section will introduce these vidence, most of which are culled from analysis of
59. J. Mark Eddy & Julie Poehlmann, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Research and Intervention
with Children of Incarcerated Parents, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 2010, supra note 12,
at 1.
60. See Phillips, supra note 16, at 24. Phillips frames the harm as procedural, that is, that parental
incarceration is a per se harm for children and its alleviation "is a matter ofjustice and does not hinge on
demonstrating a relationship between parental incarceration and adverse child outcomes." Id.
61. Controlled experiments are virtually impossible when it comes to criminal incarceration.
62. See Ofira Schwartz-Soicher, Amanda Geller & Irwin Garfinkel, The Effect of Paternal
Incarceration on Material Hardship, 85 SOC. SERV. REV. 447, 469 (2011) (finding that "material
hardship is much more intense for families experiencing a patemal incarceration than for those with no
such experience," and noting that though the underlying Fragile Families dataset does not guarantee a
causal link, the difference in the finding "is unlikely to be explained by unobserved heterogeneity
between the two types of families"). See also Amanda Geller et al., Parental Incarceration and Child
Well-being: Implications for Urban Families, 90 SoC. SCI. Q. 1186, 1198, 1200 (2009) [hereinafter
Geller et al., Parental Incarceration and Child Well-being] (finding heightened economic hardship,
residential instability, and behavioral problems for children of incarcerated parents, versus children with
never-incarcerated parents in the Fragile Families dataset); Susan D. Phillips et al., Disentangling the
Risks: Parent Criminal Justice Involvement and Children's Exposure to Family Risks, 5 CRiM. & PUB.
POL'Y 677 (2006) (noting that parental incarceration has a strong association with heightened family
resource strain).
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the longitudinal Fragile Families and Child Well Being study in the 1990s,
which reached thousands of urban families of unmarried parents, and
interviewed mothers and fathers at time of birth of their children and when the
children were one, three, and five years old. 63
1. Loss of Direct Economic Support hrough Incarceration
The economic instability precipitated by parental incarceration begins with
the loss of everyday economic support from the parent.64 Empirical studies
show that "[t]he most common answer residents [of a low-income
neighborhood] gave regarding the impact of incarceration and their lives had to
do with the way it affects them financially." 65 The degree of instability these
children experience is, of course, associated with the degree of prior support.
66
The economic support I focus on here could be financial or quasi-financial
such as through groceries, gifts, amenities, and childcare.
Past analyses tend to underestimate the contributions of incarcerated
67parents. However, recent analysis of Fragile Families data has found that
parental incarceration leads to "substantial and damaging" effects that
exacerbate economic hardship for families, including eviction and inability to
pay for material goods like healthcare.68 At least a portion of this stems from
diminished resource contributions.69 Further analysis of the dataset strongly
63. Because the Fragile Families dataset allows comparisons amongst already-disadvantaged,
similarly situated urban families, it is uniquely suited to show outcome differentials for families with
incarcerated parents versus other disadvantaged families. And because it data is longitudinal, it also
allows comparisons of conditions pre- and post-incarceration for the same family. Nevertheless, it
cannot completely disaggregate disruptive factors that may simultaneously drive incarceration and other
family disruptions. Because the core data for Fragile Families focus exclusively on unwed families (with
married couples as a comparator sample) and not all inmate parents are unwed parents, conclusions
drawn from the study may not track precisely; it may tend to underestimate the impact of parental
incarceration because we would expect children to children receive more support from their married
resident parents than from unmarried or nonresident parents.
64. BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 155 ("[B]ecause many prisoners are often a source of income in
household prior to their arrest, the per capita income in that household.., is also lowered whey they are
removed."); Bruce Western & Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families: Young Fathers with Incarceration
Experiences, in 2 FAMILIES, CRIME AND JUSTICE, 309, 312 (Greer Litton Fox & Michael L. Benson eds.,
2000) ("The most obvious consequence of incarceration is its incapacitative effect . . . If the
incarceration rate were lower, many of those currently in prison might otherwise have held jobs and
contributed to the support of families.").
65. CLEAR, supra note 8, at 130.
66. Western & Wildeman, supra note 53, at 169.
67. See Bruce Western, Becky Pettit & Josh Guetzkow, Black Economic Progress in the Era of
Mass Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: The COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF MASS
INCARCERATION 165, 165-69 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney Lind eds., 2002).
68. Schwartz-Soicher, Geller & Garfinkel, supra note 62, at 461-67, 468.
69. Id. at 470. The living arrangements of inmates and their children prior to and post incarceration
may vary depending on race, the age of the children and of the parents, and gender of the incarcerated
parent. Holly Foster, Living Arrangements of Children of Incarcerated Parents, in CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS: THEORETICAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND CLINICAL ISSUES 127, 149-52 (Yvette
R. Harris, James A. Graham & Gloria J. Oliver Carpenter eds., 2010).
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suggests a causal link between parental incarceration and a significant
reduction in financial support to children, and that this connection is unlikely
due to extraneous factors.7 °
Ethnographic and quantitative studies show that many inmates "often
provided material support (legal and illegal) for their families before they went
to prison .... This loss of support was almost never made up by the family."
71
Loss of contributions is almost certain for any parent who prior to incarceration
was a single parent or a co-parent in a two-parent household, or provided either
primary care or financial support to their children as nonresident parents. Most
incarcerated parents reported contributing to their children's well-being prior to
incarceration, and thus their exit presents a direct loSS.
72
Of the 92 percent of parents in prison who are male, 54 percent reported
providing primary financial responsibility prior to arrest regardless of whether
they lived with their children. For the 8 percent of the prison parent population
who are mothers, 52 percent reported providing primary financial support, even
though in the month immediately preceding arrest, 44 percent did not live with
their children.73 Thus, many parents who did not live with their children the
month before their arrests nevertheless provided tangible support for their
children. Of the mothers and fathers who did not contribute primary financial
responsibility to their children, about a quarter each were nevertheless
caregivers for their children.74 Forty-four percent of state and 52 percent of
federal inmate parents lived with their children prior to arrest, and in that way,
provided at least some amount of direct support.75 The aggregation of these
statistics shows that only a small minority of both mothers and fathers in prison
were neither the primary financial contributor nor caregivers for their children.
70. Amanda Geller, Irwin Garfinkel & Bruce Western, Paternal Incarceration and Support for
Children in Fragile Families, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 25,42 (2011).
71. See CLEAR, supra note 8, at 130; see also Marcia J. Carlson & Sara S. McLanahan, Fathers in
Fragile Families (Princeton University Center for Research on Child Well-being, Working Paper WP09-
14-FF, May 11, 2009) (describing the types of formal and informal financial and quasi-financial
contributions unwed fathers make towards their children).
72. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET 181-85, 227 (1997) (noting the
underreported economic contributions of poor men to their families and children).
73. A part of this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that three-fourths of children of
incarcerated mothers who were once their primary caretakers were already in foster care prior to their
mothers' incarceration. See Glaze, Maruschak & Mumola, supra note 14, at 42. Forty-two percent of
mothers in state prison identified grandmother as current caregiver. Eleven percent of mothers said care
was through a foster home, agency or institution. For fathers, the figure was two percent. Id.
74. Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 17.
75. Id.
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Parents in State Prison
-Mthers in Prison, Direct Support Priorto trcaceration I
Prmary Financial Responsibility 52%I
No Primary Support, but Lived with Child in Prior Month 38%
Total 90%
IFathers in Prison, Direct Support Prior to Incarceration ,
Primary Financial Responsibility 54%
No Primary Support, but Lived with Child In Prior Month 22%
T o t a l 7 6 % 1
76
According to a recent multi-state study of recently released prisoners,
about half the fathers reported primary care responsibilities for their minor
children in the six months prior to their incarceration, and almost a third of the
fathers had child support orders. Of those, about half said they made the
support payments, though over 90 percent acknowledged they owed back child
support.7 Children of parents like these lose the previous levels of economic
support when their parents go to prison.
78
Incarceration wreaks havoc on child well-being, even if the incarcerated
parent did not live with the child prior to prison. Beyond direct and formal
financial contributions, many incarcerated men provided informal support or
in-kind support through childcare, home maintenance, or other avenues.
79
Sociologists tracking low-income fathers conclude that "while many young
fathers have trouble holding a job and may even spend time in jail, most have
something to offer to their children., 80 This is supported both from the men's
own reports and corroborated by reports from the primary caregivers.8 1 Work
76. Figure adapted from Glaze & Maruschak, supra note 15, at 6.
77. Pamela K. Lattimore, Danielle M. Steffey & Christy A. Visher, Prisoner Reentry Experiences
of Adult Males: Characteristics, Service Receipt, and Outcomes of Participants in the SVORI Multi-site
Valuation, The Multi--Site Evaluation of the Serious And Violent Offender Reentry Initiative
(December 2009). The Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI) was designed to
improve outcomes for released prisoners. The study on the SVORI population included interviews with
1,700 parolees, 30 days pre-release and 3, 9, and 15 months post-release. /d.at v.
78. Furthermore, incarceration is a trigger event for parental separation. So while some parents may
return from incarceration and contribute at previous levels, many will not partly because their
relationship with the child's other parent has taken a turn for the worse. See SAR WAKEFIELD &
CHRISTOPHER WILDEMAN, CHILDREN OF THE PRISON BOOM 61 (2014).
79. See JOYCE A. ARDITTI, PARENTAL INCARCERATION AND THE FAMILY 79-80 (2012); EDIN &
LEIN, supra note 72, at 181-88; BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 156.
80. Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan & Thomas L. Hanson, A Patchwork Portrait of Nonresident
Fathers, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 39 (Irvin
Garfinkel et al., eds., Russell Sage Found. 1998). See also Christopher Uggen, Sara Wakefield & Bruce
Western, Work and Family Perspectives on Reentry, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA
209, 211 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005).
81. See ARDITTI, supra note 79, at 79.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
by sociologists Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein demonstrates that single-family
households headed by women received support from cohabiting mates who
assisted with childcare.82 Edin and Timothy Nelson observe in a new study of
inner-city poor fathers that the parents provided financial support on an "as
needed" approach, which in the researchers' ethnographic observation "seldom
puts cash in the hands of the child's mother but is directly responsive to
particular needs of the child." 83 Anne Nurse's study of paroled young fathers
in Northern California found that although most subjects became parents by
accident or through very transient relationships, and very few married the
mothers of their children, most were happy and proud to become fathers.8
4
About 80 percent said that prior to becoming incarcerated, they provided
money or other kinds of assistance (food, supplies) to the mother of their
children in preparation for the birth8 5 Whatever support they gave, however,
tended to be inconsistent; the men said it depended "on their child's needs in
any given week.",
86
Even for parents who did not contribute economically to their children
prior to incarceration, their imprisonment is not necessarily a neutral event
from the perspective of the child receiving resources.8 7 The trajectory of
fatherhood is a long one, and the pre-incarceration level of support is not
necessarily indicative of what that parent would have contributed in a different
turn of events. Edin and Nelson note that "most fathers who have grown
disconnected from their children are seldom satisfied with the scrap ends of
fatherhood. For most, the desire to father actively-and claim the 'whole father
experience'-is strong.' 88 For many parents who end up in prison, the pre-
incarceration level of support many not be an appropriate benchmark to
evaluate their future contributions to their children had they not been in prison.
Finally, even for parents who did not provide and would not have provided
economic support to their children prior to their incarceration, incarceration can
still be significantly adverse for their children's financial needs, because there
is a possibility that these parents could have changed course had their sentences
been shorter. Edin and Nelson note that fathers' contribution to their children's
lives is a dynamic model, which could be disrupted by a number of factors,
82. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 72.
83. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER
CITY 111 (2013).
84. NURSE, supra note 16, at 32-33. Nurse's subjects were participants in the Northern Region of
the California Youth Authority, which supervises serious and repeat juvenile offenders in California.
This finding is echoed by Edin & Nelson's findings that many of these parents were extremely happy to
have a child, even under disadvantaged circumstances.
85. NURSE, supra note 16, at 33-34.
86. Id. at 97.
87. As the following subsections will show, even the exit of those parents confer economic
disadvantage on their children. See infra Part II.B.2-5.
88. EDIN & NELSON, supra note 83, at 189.
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including incarceration.89 In another study, Edin, Nelson and Rechelle Parranal
document the possibility of prison as a transformative point for men who
previously had no relationships with their children.90 They found that for
"offenders whose lifestyle had created a wedge between himself and his family
prior to ... incarceration can be a turning point .... In some cases, fathers in
this group use the experience of incarceration to rebuild severed ties with
children."91 This suggests that for some parents, the impetus for providing
support to their children may arise after they have already been committed to
incarceration. The length of their remaining time in prison, however, prevents
them from acting on their wishes to provide resources.
Though the negative impact of parental incarceration does not apply evenly
to the children of all incarcerated parents,92 there is no doubt that there are
severe and widespread collateral consequences of losing a parent to prison. The
reduction in resources contributes to childhood economic insecurity. 93
2. Additional Costs that Families Bear from Parental Incarceration
The loss of income and the instability triggered by incarceration poses deep
strains on the remaining caregiver(s), such as the child's mother or
grandparents.94 Not only does the incarceration remove a source of economic
support for many families, but it also imposes additional financial burdens.
"[T]he effects of incarceration.., are far more expansive than the lost earnings
of offenders alone."95 Alternative effects are documented by a recent study
based on Fragile Families data, which suggested that the exacerbation of
material hardship for families of incarcerated parents stems in part from direct
losses in support as well as the other parent's reduced capabilities as a result of
incarceration.
96
Incarceration both "diminishes family income and . . . [increases] family
expenses."97 The loss of the other parent as a romantic companion, a source of
financial support, or an additional caregiver creates additional stresses and
89. Id. at 173-75.
90. Kathryn Edin, Timothy J. Nelson & Rechelle Paranal, Fatherhood and Incarceration as
Potential Turning Points in the Criminal Careers of Unskilled Men (Insti. for Policy Research Working
Paper No. WP-0 1-02, 2001).
91. Id. at 7.
92. See Wildeman & Western, supra note 53, at 169.
93. While Edin and Nelson's interviews with inner-city fathers showed that some criticized the
"emphasis on financial provision" as a cornerstone of fatherhood, and that they believed "spending
money on children is nowhere as important as spending time," resource deprivation is a reality for these
children and cannot be corrected absent intervention. See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 83, at 142.
94. See ARDITTI, supra note 79, at 113.
95. BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 157.
96. Schwartz-Soicher, Geller & Garfinkel, supra note 62, at 470.
97. Wildeman & Western, supra note 53, at 166.
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costs on nonincarcerated caretakers.98 Furthermore, the costs associated with
having an incarcerated family member-everything from civil forfeiture, to
very costly phone calls, to co-payments on the inmate's health care-all take
resources away from children. 99
In an ethnographic study of women who were romantically involved with
inmates at San Quentin prison, Megan Comfort documents some of the ways in
which a partner's incarceration can cause severe resource strain. "Girlfriends
and wives often send money and care packages, accept expensive collect phone
calls, spend money traveling to visit inmates, and support their children."'
0 0
The rationales for doing so are complex. In one account, for example, Alice
Goffman discusses the dilemma that many women face when police pressure
them to provide information against their partners, and the resulting efforts to
provide support to incarcerated partners as a way to "salvag[e] their moral
worth in the wake of their betrayals," which are often aired out in public.' 01
In Comfort's study, half the women said they sent money, ranging from a
few hundred dollars initially to weekly allowances. 102 When considering the
income levels that many of these families have, these marginal outlays are
significant. Even if the incarcerated parent was completely delinquent in
providing support and drained family resources before going to prison, his
"stay in prison can simply shift the financial drain from maintaining the person
on the streets to helping him cope in prison."'
03
These are "women trying to hold families together when ties are weakened
by prolonged absence; women attempting to manage the shame and stigma of
incarceration; and women trying to prevent children from becoming casualties
of the war on drugs."' 104 These burdens, and the understandable failure to
succeed at carrying them, in turn create more stresses on the entire family. The
financial straits that deepen as a result of incarceration "tend[] to exacerbate all
the other problems of intimacy, closeness, and reintegration back into the
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Creasie Finney Hairston, Prisoners and Their Families: Parenting Issues During
Incarceration, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, 259, 265-66 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003)
(noting the costs of collect calls and the cost of healthcare copays in prison). The Federal
Communications Commission in 2013 voted to cap the amount that phone companies can charge for
prisoners' calls. Phone companies have challenged this in federal court. The FCC's interim rates went
into effect in February 2014, but the ultimate rates will depend on the D.C. Circuit's review. See Securus
Technologies, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13-80 (D.C. Cir 2013). Moreover, this rule does not apply to in-state
calls.
100. BRAHMAN, supra note 9, at 87; see also CLEAR, supra note 8, at 132.
101. See GOFFMAN, supra note 27, at 75, 82.
102. COMFORT, supra note 36, at 84. See also other empirical accounts, such as ARDIT"I, supra
note 79, at 110, estimating monthly support at $75.
103. CLEAR, supra note 8, at 132.
104. Beth Richie, The Social Impact of Mass Incarceration on Women, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT,
supra note 67, 136, 147.
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family and the community."10 5 Incarceration of a child's parent led "many
caregivers [to leave] their jobs after the incarceration and began receiving
social welfare support."'10 6 It also "saps the savings of grandparents."'0 7 It is not
difficult to trace the financial and material losses that lead to destabilized daily
life: the loss of a caretaker and a provider of income and goods will lead to
more stresses on the family's breadwinner. The results are diminished
resources and heightened instability in the lives of their children.' 
08
3. Cumulative Loss in Ability to Contribute Due to Ex-Felon Status
The analysis above has thus far only focused on the economic
consequences for children created while their parents are in prison. Yet a large
component of reduced support results from the erosion of their incarcerated
parent's earning potential after release.' 09 The loss of employment and wage-
earning opportunities and access to public benefits and housing for ex-inmates
directly maps onto a loss in capacity for ex-inmates to contribute to their
children. " 0 The result is that "[w]hile prison removes men from families, the
echo of incarceration continues well after release from prison." III
The loss of future parental contribution based on criminal record status-
felt particularly acutely by black and younger ex-felons ll-is an important but
often-overlooked mechanism by which parental incarceration confers
disadvantage on children. The cumulative effect of loss in parental income as a
result of incarceration can be discounted back in time; this figure would
represent the full amount of financial loss to the child as a result of parental
incarceration.
Data demonstrates that incarceration is an independent driver of lower
employment and income attainment. 3 Though "convicted felons often enter
prison with a history of unemployment, low educational attainment, and few
marketable job skills,"' 14 research shows that incarceration confers additional
barriers to employment and wage-earning beyond the existing problems of too
105. R. Robin Miller, Various Implications of the "Race to Incarcerate" on Incarcerated Afr[ican
American Men and Their Families, in IMPACTS OF INCARCERATION ON THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
FAMILY 1, 8 (Othello Harris & R. Robin Miller eds., 2003).
106. ARDITTI, supra note 79, at 110.
107. BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 156.
108. See, e.g., Schwartz-Soicher, Geller & Garfinkel, supra note 62, at 469-70.
109. Devah Pager, Marked, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937,960-62 (2003).
110. Western & McLanahan, supra note 64, at 17.
111. Id.
112. See WESTERN, supra note 43, at 115-25. Younger inmates are also more likely to be parents of
dependent children.
113. See, e.g., Geller et al., Parental Incarceration and Child Well-being, supra note 62, at 2.
114. Uggen, Wakefield & Western, supra note 80, at 211.
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few opportunities.115 Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) from 1983 to 2000, Bruce Western explores whether prison
reduces the economic prospects of ex-offenders, or if these individuals' lower
prospects are "simply a predictable result of skill deficiencies and a propensity
for antisocial behavior."116 He found that incarceration reduces annual wages
of Whites, Hispanics, and Blacks (by 9 percent, 10 percent, and 8 percent,
respectively), and that ex-felon status was associated with less continuous
employment for Blacks and Hispanics."17 Incarceration reduces total lifetime
earnings by 40 percent for individuals. "1 8 And across groups, it is responsible
for a 4 percent increase in the poverty rate amongst Blacks (2.7 percent
increase in poverty rate for Hispanics and 1 percent for Whites).' 19 Western
adds that the deficit in employment prospects for ex-felons "produces economic
conditions for continued crime," 120 which may lead to continued diminished or
no earnings if the individual is apprehended.
There are two major mechanisms by which former incarceration status
leads to lower earnings: employers' unwillingness to hire ex-felons and the
erosion of skills and ties while inmates are in prison. 121 On the first factor,
Devah Pager's experiment separates the specific effect of the stigma of
criminal history from other background drivers of employment outcomes for
ex-felons. In the study, black and white men with identical educational
records and work experience as well as physical presentation were randomly
assigned criminal records and applied for jobs.123 In auditing 350 employers in
the initial application process, the study found that both race and incarceration
status were significant drivers of employment prospects. Incarceration status
reduced both black and white applicants' likelihood of being called back.
Whites with no criminal record were called back 34 percent of the time,
115. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 25-27 (1996) (documenting
drops in real wages and availability of jobs, as well as discrimination, residential segregation, and the
shift away from industrial labor).
116. WESTERN, supra note 43, at 116.
117. ld. at 124.
118. Id. at 126.
119. Id. at 127.
120. Id. at 130.
121. See Uggen, Wakefield & Western, supra note 80, at 220; Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling &
David F. Weiman, The Labor Market Consequences oJ'lncarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 410,
412 (2001); Wildeman & Western, supra note 53, at 165-66.
122. Pager, supra note 109, at 937. Pager's experimental design improves on previous resume
experiments by expanding the types ofjobs and making clearer to the employer the race of the applicant.
Id. at 943. There are also explicit regulatory barriers to employment for ex-felons for some jobs, which
is not "stigma" per se but nevertheless limit the scope of jobs available. See Patricia M. Harris &
Kimberly S. Keller, Ex-Offenders Need Not Apply: The Criminal Background Check in Hiring
Decisions, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 6 (2005); Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A Stoll.
Employment Barriers Facing Ex-Offenders, URBAN INSTITUTE REENTRY ROUNDTABLE: EMPLOYMENT
DIMENSIONS OF REENTRY: UNDERSTANDING THE NEXUS BETWEEN PRISONER REENTRY AND WORK 15-
16 (2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410855-holzer.pdf.
123. Pager, supra note 109, at 946-48.
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compared to 17 percent for Whites with ex-felon status. Blacks without a
criminal record were called back 14 percent of the time, faring even worse than
white ex-felons. Blacks with a criminal record faced the biggest hurdle, getting
called back only 5 percent of the time. 124 Pager also points out that failure to
obtain employment has knock-on effects. As time passes, the negative
employment outcomes due to race and incarceration status "then exacerbates
the manifestation of stigma; the cumulative disadvantage that accrues to such
individuals sets into motion a self-reinforcing cycle."' 25 The recognition of the
stigma of incarceration has led to "Ban the Box" campaigns to eliminate
employer application forms that ask for criminal record status at early stages. 1
26
Nevertheless, incarceration still vastly reduces employment prospects, which in
turn reduces incarcerated parents' ability to contribute financially to their
children's well-being.
A second way in which prison reduces employment prospects is through
the erosion of job skills and social ties while in prison. Prison disrupts and
reconfigures the inmate's social universe, "replacing social connections to
legitimate employment" if that ever existed. 127 Thus, the reduction in social
capital that follows is a negative driver of employment opportunity128 as
inmates lose contacts that would lead them to legitimate employment. In
addition, "[t]ime out of employment prevents the acquisition of skills obtained
by others who remain continuously employed . . . [and] behaviors that are
adaptive for survival in prison are likely to be inconsistent with work routines
outside."129 A stronger formulation is that prisons are themselves criminogenic,
not only by reducing re-entry opportunities afterwards but by creating "schools
of crime" for inmates: by acquainting them with other criminals in prison and
by connecting prisoners to criminal opportunities afterwards.'30 All in all,
though the specific causal effects of prison on the prisoner's internal capacities
and attitudes are difficult to document as the ex-inmate immediately begins to
accumulate post-prison adjustment, 31 it is clear that imprisonment is likely to
124. Id. at 955-59.
125. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED 149 (2004).
126. See Ban the Box, ALL OF US OR NONE, http://www.allofusornone.org/campaigns/ban-the-box.
This campaign has met some success in many localities across the country. Ban the Box: Major U.S.
Cities and Counties Adopt Fair Hiring Policies to Remove Unfir Barriers to Employment of People
with Criminal Records, NAT'L EMPL. L. PROJ. (Nov. 2012), http://www.nelp.org/page//SCLP/201 1/
CityandCountyHiringlnitiatives.pdf.
127. Uggen, Wakefield & Western, supra note 80, at 221.
128. See MARK GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS AND CAREERS (2d ed.
1985).
129. Id.
130. Shadd Maruan & Hans Toch, The Impact of Imprisonment on the Desistance Process, in
PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA, supra note 114, at 139, 152-57 (citing Donald Clemmer's
coining of the term "prisonization"). For other accounts of prisonization, see DONALD CLEMMER, THE
PRISON COMMUNITY (1940). For an influential account of the culture of deprivation sustained by
prisons, see GRESHAM SYKES, SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1965).
131. See Maruan & Toch, supra note 130, at 157.
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reduce the ability of the inmate to financially contribute to his children post-
release.
In addition, ex-felon status often creates legal barriers for incarcerated
parents' access to public benefits and housing, which compounds whatever
wage-earning problems they already face.'32 For example, federal law bars
individuals with felony drug convictions from receiving TANF and food stamp
benefits unless their states affirmatively opt out of the ban.' 33 Difficulty finding
a job, as discussed above, would also make it hard for these individuals to meet
the TANF work requirements. 134 Subsidized housing programs follow a one-
strike-and-you're-out policy with criminal records, making it extremely
difficult for poor parents who have criminal records to find affordable
housing. 135 These factors all culminate in the loss of earnings'36 and diminish
the incarcerated parent's inability to contribute economically to their children
post-release.
The fact that ex-inmates have diminished income opportunities has major
implications for an incarceration insurance program that asks parents to pay
back. I discuss those considerations in depth in Part IV. However, the very fact
of this diminished capacity-along with the direct incapacitation of parental
contribution from incarceration and the high costs of having a child's parent in
prison for existing caretakers-strongly supports the proposition that parental
incarceration is a unique causal driver of childhood disadvantage above and
beyond those conferred by adverse background conditions alone.
4. Beyond Economic Instability: Incarceration's Other Harms
So far, we have focused on economic losses because they are the harms
that virtually always accompany parental incarceration and are the harms most
directly addressed by the proposal for incarceration insurance. However, there
are a host of noneconomic harms to children that can result from parental
incarceration. Some of these harms are just as important, if not more so, than
resource deprivation alone. Though the proposal for incarceration insurance
does not address these harms head-on, it is important to understand them in
situating a policy tool amongst other reforms.
Numerous studies find associational relationships between parental
incarceration and nonphysical adverse childhood outcomes, including antisocial
132. See AMY E. HIRSCH ET AL., EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH





136. See Westcrn, Kling & Weiman, supra note 121, at 424 (reviewing a swath of sociological
studies to conclude that "serving time in prison can diminish an individual's earnings but not necessarily
employment prospects").
[Vol. 26:1
2014] Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk 113
and aggressive behavior, lower academic achievement, emotional fragility and
mental problems, and future criminal activity. 137 They corroborate the direct
empirical finding that children whose fathers go to prison are more
disadvantaged compared to similarly situated children whose fathers do not go
to prison.' 38 In general, the link between parental incarceration and childhood
disadvantage is supported by evidence of aggregation of risk factors:
The most consistent finding in research on children of incarcerated
parents is that they are exposed to a greater total number of risk factors
than other children. In other words, as a group, children of
incarcerated parents are not just more likely to be exposed to parental
substance abuse or domestic violence or inadequately educated parents
or family disruption or any other single risk factor associated with
parent criminality and incarceration. 139
Longitudinal studies have also documented direct linkages between
parental incarceration and childhood disadvantage. A review of ten longitudinal
studies on the effects of parental incarceration corroborates the hypothesis that
the risk for behavioral and mental health problems possibly increases with
parental incarceration.' A new study uses longitudinal and cross-section
analysis of Fragile Families data to increase confidence in the proposition
parental incarceration is a unique driver of childhood disadvantage, by finding
137. For existing studies on the non-financial effects of parental incarceration on children, see
ARDirri, supra note 79, at 101-09; Amanda Geller et al., Beyond Absenteeism: Father Incarceration
and Child Development, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 49, 51 (2011) [hereinafter Geller et al., Beyond Absenteeism]
(finding heightened behavioral and developmental problems in children in Fragile Families that have
incarcerated parents); Geller et al., Parental Incarceration and Child Well-being, supra note 62, at 1196-
97 (demonstrating that children with fathers in prison face more severe economic, family, and housing
problems than their counterparts); Denise Johnston, Effects of Parental Incarceration, in CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS 1995, supra note 16, at 59 (documenting psychological and developmental
effects); Sara S. McLanahan & Marcia J. Carlson, Welfare Refbrm, Fertility and Father Involvement, 12
FUTURE OF CHILD. 147 (2002) (using Fragile Families data, showing that incarcerated fathers are more
likely than non-incarcerated fathers to be violent, African-American, less educated, and exposed to drug
abuse); Joseph Murray, David P. Farrington & Ivana Sekol, Children 's Antisocial Behavior, Mental
Health, Drug Use, and Educational Performance After Parental Incarceration: A Systematic Review
and Meta-Analysis, 138 Psy. BUtLL. 175, 190 (2012) (performing a meta-analysis of 40 existing studies
and finding that rigorous studies tend to point to a connection between parental incarceration and later
antisocial behavior); Christopher Wildeman, Paternal Incarceration and Children's Physically
Aggressive Behaviors, 89 Soc. FORCES 285 (20 10). See also Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The
Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME & JUST. 133, 172 (2008) (surveying empirical
studies).
138. See Geller et al., Parental Incarceration and Child Well-being, supra note 62, at 1200 (finding
the associational relationship after isolating extraneous factors, based on Fragile Families data).
139. Phillips, supra note 16, at 19.
140. See Joseph Murray, Longitudinal Research on the Effects of Parental Incarceration on
Children, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 2010, supra note 12, at 55, 69. Though these
studies, like most others, are unable to "isolate the causal effects of incarceration from the confounding
effects of family disadvantage," Geller et al, Beyond Absenteeism, supra note 137, at 52. Yet, they
contribute to an understanding of the severity of disadvantage associated with parental incarceration.
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that differences in childhood aggression in children with incarcerated fathers
are at least partially causal and remain significant after scenario-testing. 4 ' The
study separated the developmental effects for Fragile Families children with
incarcerated fathers and those who did not, and distilled away the chances that
the differences in these effects by confounding family variables. It also
compared the effects of paternal incarceration against the effects of other forms
of paternal absence and found that "paternal incarceration has significant and
damaging consequences for the socioemotional well-being of young
children."'142 Specifically, there is a "robust relationship between incarceration
and child aggression,"143 after controlling for many variables, such as parents'
relationship status, income, maternal education, and other forms of paternal
absence. The study also found that children of incarcerated parents exhibited
these behavioral problems more starkly after incarceration. 144 Furthermore, the
study found that the effects are strongest for children whose parents resided
with them before incarceration, but is still significant for nonresidential
parents.145 The study also found a similar relationship between paternal
incarceration and attention problems in the children, though the results were not
as significant. 146
There are two overall mechanisms that can frame the specific symptoms
identified by researchers. First, he removal of a parent through incarceration is
a form of disruption that hampers the child's development. 147 The result of this
disruption will vary according to many other confounding factors. Second, the
departure of a parent is damaging to attachments that children have with their
parent, and the severance of this link creates breakdowns in socio-emotional
functioning. Young children "not only suffer separation distress and anxiety but
also setbacks in the quality of their next attachments, which will be less
trustful." 148 For older children, the problem may manifest in the form of feeling
rejected and subsequently feeling "[r]esentment towards the adults who have
141. See Geller et al., Beyond Absenteeism, supra note 137, at 62-68.
142. Id. at 71.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 59.
145. See id. at 72.
146. See id. at 68. There was no significant relationship between paternal incarceration and other
child development issues, such as verbal ability, internalization of problems, and health (as reported by
the child's mother). In addition, the results of a forthcoming study suggest that maternal incarceration
may have null effects on children's behavioral issues. See Christopher Wildeman & Kristin Tumey,
Positive, Negative, or Null? The Effects of Maternal Incarceration on Children 's Behavioral Problems,
51 DEMOGRAPHY 1041, 1064 (2014).
147. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD, 32 (1973) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEYOND BEST INTERESTS] (noting
that "changes in the external world" disrupt the developmental process of children, who are also
undergoing internal changes).
148. Id. at 33.
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disappointed them in the past makes them adopt the attitudes of not caring for
anybody." 1
49
Furthermore, the noneconomic effects of separation are not confined to the
socio-emotional realm. Paul Tough documents powerful, emerging scientific
evidence that demonstrates that adverse childhood experiences-parental
incarceration being one of them-have strong associations with long-lasting
physical and developmental effects.'50 Scientists tracking adverse childhood
experience ("ACE") factors, "from overcrowding to poverty to family
turmoil," 151 have found "a surprisingly linear dose-response model: the higher
the ACE score, the worse the outcome on almost every measure from addictive
behavior to chronic disease."'52 A series of studies that dissected various
contributing factors concluded both in the strength of the relationship, and in
findings that ACE factors also had pathological effects,153 where the "key
channel through which early adversity causes damage to developing bodies is
stress," or what scientists call "allostatic load"--the cumulative stressor effects
that children bear. 154 The higher the ACE score, the higher the allostatic load
on children, and the more susceptible they are to adverse health and
developmental outcomes: everything from heart disease, addiction, poor
concentration, and other impaired executive-function skills. 155 These effects are
caused by the onset of adverse childhood experiences, but they are also
compounded by the loss of "secure attachment relationships with caregivers,"
which can "buffer the effects of stress and trauma." 56 In this context, then,
parental incarceration can create a parallel conduit to negative physical effects
in children later on, because it constitutes both the very environmental stress
trigger that builds on allostatic load and the deprivation of a buffer effect that
could have alleviated other environmental stressors for already-disadvantaged
children. 1
57
The ways in which socioemotional and developmental damage occurs
varies depending on the child, the parent, and many other contextual factors.
Therefore, there is not-and nor should we expect there to be-
homogeneity. 158 In fact, "even among groups of prisoners' children selected for
149. Id. at 34.
150. See PAUL TOUGH, HOW CHILDREN SUCCEED 32 (2012).
151. Id.; see also THE ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES STUDY, http://www.acestudy.org
[hereinafter ACES STUDY].
152. TOUGH, supra note 1507, at 10.
153. See id. at 1l.
154. Id. at 12-13.
155. Id. at II -13, 1992.
156. Seeid. at 192.
157. See id.; ACES STUDY, supra note 1518.
158. See Susan D. Phillips & James P. Gleeson, What We Know Now that We Didn't Know Then
about the Criminal Justice System 's Involvement in Families with whom Child Welfare Agencies Have
Contact 4 CENTER FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND RESEARCH, JANE ADDAMS COLLEGE OF SOCIAL WORK,
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO (July 2007), http://www.fcnetwork.org/reading/
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study because of their emotional, behavioral or disciplinary problems, few of
the children had problems in every area and all of the children were performing
adequately in one or more areas."'
' 59
This proposal focuses on material deprivation, precisely because it is
difficult to identify and attribute all of these other negative outcomes directly to
parental incarceration. 16  Granting children incarceration insurance will
probably not go very far in counteracting socioemotional damage or physical
harm due to stress, but it may help by raising the standard of living for children
and reduce the total impact of disadvantage.
5. Confounding Variables and the Myth of the "Bad Parent"
The above research documents the phenomena that parental incarceration
visits on children both tangible, economic harm and intangible, socioemotional
and long-term physiological detriment. An important counterargument against
the very idea that parental incarceration is harmful to children, however, posits
that parents who are sent away to prison are so dangerous or so deeply
entrenched in harmful criminal activity that their children are better off without
their influence. This is an important question to address, and may ring true for a
very limited subset of incarcerated parents. Because incarcerated parents and
non-incarcerated non-resident parents are similar in many ways,161 poor
outcomes identified by scholars may be picking up the effects of general
disadvantage rather than imprisonment. 62 However, ample evidence supports
the proposition that the vast majority of children of incarcerated parents are
made worse off in both tangible and intangible-but wholly real-ways as a
result of their parents' incarceration. As Fragile Families data analysis
demonstrates through cross-sectional control tests, reductions in family income
after parental incarceration is not "simply due to their being 'bad' fathers" in
what we -know-now.pdf.
159. Johnston, supra note 16, at 65.
160. The wounds that incarceration inflicts are deep and some are even less visible and traceable
than the long-term developmental and psychological effects on children described above. See BRAMAN,
supra note 9, at 10 (describing families' own beliefs that incarceration is responsible fraying kinship
bonds and socially destructive behavior).
161. See Seymour, supra note 50, at 474 (describing similarities between the two populations, but
noting that "they are different in ways that make them and their families a challenging population to
serve"); see also Kathi J. Kemper & Frederick P. Rivara, Parents in Jail, 92 PEDIATRICS 261, 264
(1993).
162. See Christopher Wildeman, Mass Parental Imprisonment, Social Policy, and the Future of
Inequality in America, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 2010, supra note 12, at 303, 309
(cautioning against drawing causal conclusions too quickly and suggesting using experimental macro-
level data in future studies to tease out the causal mechanisms); Danielle H. Dallaire, Incarcerated
Mothers and Fathers: A Comparison of Risks for Children and Families, 56 FAM. RELATIONS 440, 441
(2007) (noting that these children "may be particularly vulnerable to poor outcomes because of their
exposure to an array of background, contextual, or sociodemographic factors"); Kennedy, supra note 15,
at 93 (noting that negative child outcomes may occur "at least partially ... from the ill effects of living
in poverty").
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general but rather due to the distinct disadvantages conferred by prison on
ability to access the labor market, relationship quality, and removal from their
children.' 
63
Furthermore, whatever distinctions exist between convicted criminals and
noncriminals, there is little reason to believe that such distinctions are
particularly good indicators of parenting ability. Parents who are incarcerated
but have no prior neglect or abuse problems are not necessarily bad parents,' 
64
and they are likely good enough parents from the child's point of view or better
than no parent at all.
This is not to say that some children are probably better off with their
parent in prison rather than wreaking havoc on their daily lives through abuse
or other means. But most inmates'65 are in prison for crimes that do not relate
directly to their desire or ability to care for their children. 166 The state does not
automatically remove parental rights upon incarceration precisely for that
reason. 167 In fact, parenting classes in prisons operate on the premise that
"[p]eople can be bad citizens but good parents."'168 It is also the impetus behind
efforts to grant greater visitation opportunities between parents and their
children. 1
69
In fact, behavior that lands many disadvantaged parents in prison may have
little bearing on parenting. For example, some incarcerated parents are young
teenagers who are earning income for the first time. Others are unable to find
other work, or are those who provide payments to their children through
underground income because they are unable to shoulder wage garnishments on
163. Geller, Garfinkel & Western, supra note 70, at 43-44.
164. See, e.g., CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 1, supra note 16, at 7-8; Kennedy, supra note
15, at 90 ("Many parents who find themselves in prison are not necessarily bad parents by virtue of their
incarceration and may, in fact, be good and effective parents. One cannot generalize about the parenting
skills of incarcerated parents...").
165. The vast majority of parents in prison are incarcerated for nonviolent offense. Those who
commit abuses against their partners or children often get their parental rights terminated upon
incarceration for those offenses. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 96-97 (describing state statutes that
predicate parental rights termination on certain crimes). But see Kemper & Rivara, supra note 161, at
262 (charting drug abuse behavior in parents in jails).
166. For a discussion of policies of removal of parental rights for incarcerated parents, see Mitchell,
supra note 14.
167. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62
(2000). When the state does remove parental rights of incarcerated parents, such as through petitions to
terminate parental rights (TPR) through the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
89, I1 Stat. 2115 (codified 'as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), it does so because the
parent's crime was against the child or because the child has been in foster care for an extended period
of time. The TPR process has also been criticized for its structural inequalities with respect to race and
class. See generally Mitchell, supra note 14.
168. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 96.
169. See id. ("Relationships between fathers and the mothers of their children have a profound
effect on kids. Contact between incarcerated fathers and their children can have a positive impact on
both.").
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licit income. 170 Both may legitimately believe that illicit markets are the only
viable means of making a living. 171
The rise in incarceration rates has largely been due to the erosion of
economic opportunities in the inner cities and more draconian criminal justice
policies,172 not a rise in some inherent antisocial nature of low-income people.
As the rate of incarceration has grown, partially driven by possession crimes
and heavy policing in certain areas, the prison population "has come to
resemble more closely the general population" in certain areas.'73 The
distinction between which parents end up in prison and which ones do not is
often one of structural policies and inequalities in enforcement rather than
dangerousness. The distinction between which parent stays in prison for longer,
away from their child, is often set by circumstances unrelated to parental ability
but rather to events prior to or at arrest, or the operation of the legal system.
Indeed, the racial data makes it hard to forge the conclusion that
imprisoning a parent generally removes a negative influence in children's lives.
To believe that children are no worse off as a result of their "bad parents" going
to prison, one would have to believe either that people from communities that
have higher incarceration rates are generally bad parents, or that those
convicted of crimes are different from noncriminals in a meaningful way that
generally hews closely to bad parenting. 174 It would mean believing that half of
black children with high school dropout fathers are better off with their fathers
in prison. The line that incarceration draws mostly includes people who have
done wrong things, but it is not a close match to the line demarcating people
who are not adequate parents.
The evidence supports the conclusion that incarcerating a parent causes
actual disadvantage to his child, even though the parent was engaged in
170. See Ronald B. Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, Delivering Dads: Paternalism, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fragile Families, in THE NEW PATERNALISM 130 (Lawrence M. Mead ed., 1997)
(noting that issues of illegal income and garnishment for fathers paying, or trying to pay, child support);
Hillard Pouncy, Towards a Fruitful Policy Discourse about Less-Educated Young Men, in BLACK
MALES LEFT BEHIND 293, 301 (Ronald B. Mincy ed., 2006) (noting that efforts to "empower" young
poor men did not go far because barriers to the job market still left them unemployed). Mincy and
Pouncy point out that in the period between 1979 and 2000, "employment rates of young, less-educated
black men fell by 16 percentage points while those of comparable young black women rose by I
percentage point." Ronald B. Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, Op-Ed: Fatherhood Programs May Lift Up
Young Men, BALT. SUN, Apr. 17, 2006.
171. See BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 154-55; MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE
AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 13 (2004) ("To many disadvantaged inner-city
American teenagers, for example, drug dealing, in comparison with other available options, appears to
be a sensible and relatively low-risk way to earn money and improve their lives."); WILSON, supra note
115; Pager, supra note 109.
172. See WESTERN, supra note 43, at 109-110, 130; Wildeman & Western, supra note 53, at 159.
173. Wildeman & Western, supra note 53, at 163.
174. One might also wonder if the exit of a crime-involved parent may usher in an opportunity for a
"better" social parent as a replacement. However, there is no evidence that mothers' repartnering
reduces material hardship for the family. See Schwartz-Soicher, Geller & Garfinkel, supra note 62, at
469.
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unlawful behavior and could have chosen a better path. The relevant basis of
comparison is what would have happened without the parent's incarceration.
Unless the would-be incarcerated parent exerts such a detrimental effect on the
child's life that we as a society would want to remove his parental status even
absent his incarceration, the argument that his incarceration is not a true
deprivation for his children seems to fall flat. Even though some parents may
exert some bad influences on their children, the forcible removal of that parent
from their children's life does not "offer such children something better.... By
its intrusion the state may make a bad situation worse; indeed, it may turn a
tolerable or even a good situation into a bad one."' 
75
Moreover, the very act of separation from even rather imperfect parents
can be damaging to children.176 The bonds that children form with their
parents-even those who are not around all the time, and even those "with
impoverished or unstable personalities," nevertheless can lead to "extremely
painful" severances. 177 After all, being "forced to dismantle existing emotional
ties . . . is no easy task for any human being. Children are especially
unequipped for such losses."'178 That parents may have exerted bad influences
does not necessarily figure into their children's world view and thus is often
difficult to account for in the children's view of trauma. After all, "[f]or the
child who is the innocent victim of such traumatic happenings," it does matter
much why the reassignment is happening external to the relationship.179 The
state should evaluate the child's well-being based on harm avoidance, and
refrain from making sweeping long-term conclusions.' 
80
This section demonstrated that relative to the baseline of child well-being
prior to parental incarceration and relative to similarly situated families without
incarcerated parents, the advent of parental incarceration puts children at risk of
a special and distinct form of economic insecurity and other negative outcomes.
The proposal for incarceration insurance aims primarily at the three pathways
of material economic deprivation.
175. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN, THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 92 (1998).
176. See Seymour, supra note 50, at 6 (noting that children of incarcerated parents may have other
"therapeutic" needs stemming from trauma and stigma of the involuntary removal of a parent).
177. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEYOND BEST INTERESTS, supra note 147, at 19-20.
178. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEFORE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 32, at 53-54.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 52 ("In the long run, the child's chances will be better if the law is less pretentious
and ambitious in its aim, that is, if it confines itself to the avoidance of harm and acts in accord with a
few, even if modest, generally applicable short-term predictions.").
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C. The Severity of Parental Incarceration Disadvantage
While the previous subsection explicated the causal mechanisms of how
parental incarceration reduces resources to children, this subsection is
concerned with the severity of that disadvantage. Besides demonstrating that
parental incarceration is a unique driver of negative consequences for child
well-being, it is important to understand whether these consequences are
marginal or severe, though the previously exposition of evidence hints at the
latter.
Parental incarceration is generally accompanied by an increase in child
poverty. An analysis of childhood poverty through the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics found that rate of children living in poverty increases from 22
percent to 31 percent in the years following their fathers' incarceration, and
does not diminish significantly in the first years after his release. 18 Family
income on average decreased by $8,726, or 22 percent.182 Much of this is
directly attributable to incarceration. Fragile Families data analysis reveals that
fathers with histories of incarceration contributed on average $1,300 less per
year than never-incarcerated fathers. 83 This represents a quarter of the average
contribution in prior years for the families in the sample 84-in other words, a
significant amount. This figure reflects the deprivation of income due to
parental incapacitation while incarcerated, as well as the decline in income after
reentry due to labor market reactions. While the study did not account for in-
kind support,1 85 the direct financial contribution picture is enough to show that
the incarceration disadvantage is severe.
The effects of economic insecurity on children's physical, educational,
emotional, and social development are very real and documented at length by
researchers generally. More specifically, analyses of Fragile Families data have
specifically shown that children of incarcerated fathers experience greater
material hardship as measured by incidents such as failure to pay for food,
housing, gas and electric utilities, doctors' visits, and telephone service.'86 In
turn, deprivation of food, shelter, healthcare, and other material goods have
clear impacts on child well-being both in the short term and long term.1
87
181. ARDITTI,supra note 77, at 110.
182. Id.
183. Geller, Garfinkel & Western, supra note 70, at 39.
184. Id. The study also found that newly incarcerated fathers contribute on average $1,700 less than
their counterparts in the first year of the study. Id.
185. Id. at 45.
186. See Schwartz-Soicher, Geller & Garfinkel, supra note 62, at 454, 468.
187. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Gershoff et al., Income is Not Enough: Incorporating Material
Hardship into Models of Income Associations with Parenting and Child Development, 78 CHILD DEV'T
70 (2007); Robert C. Whitaker, Shannon M. Phillips & Sean M. Orzol, Food Insecurity and the Risks of
Depression and Anxiety in Mothers and Behavior Problems in Their Preschool-Aged Children, 118
PEDIATRICS 859 (2006). See also supra Part ll.B.4 (documenting the effects of poverty and other
stressors on later health problems).
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Recent research has found that the recent incarceration of a parent increases the
likelihood that a child experiences homelessness. 188
One point in particular is worth emphasizing here: for poor children, the
marginal cost of losing support due to parental incarceration often has acute
and dramatic consequences. Sociologists document the sentiment among family
members that
loss of income in the family negatively [due to incarceration] affects
the family because the mother cannot support the family as well ...
[o]ne woman said, 'so when that father is pulled away, that leaves him
[the child] depending solely on the mother who cannot give him
sufficient of what the father was giving him.' An older woman who
works in the neighborhood said she sees kids going hungry when the
father goes to prison. 189
Because poor families never had much to make ends meet in the first place,
the loss of even a marginal amount of support due to a parent's incarceration
can have a dramatic impact on the child.
Another way to estimate the severity of withdrawal of support due to
parental incarceration is to examine the impact of child support on poor
families. The experiences of families whose parents do not contribute child
support can parallel those of families with an incarcerated parent. Studies about
the impact of child support show that because poor men and poor women often
have children together, and because poor women have limited sources of
income, "nonresident fathers' economic contributions through child support
play an important role in helping children to avoid poverty."'1 90 Numerous
studies document the ways in which child support reduces child poverty
through direct transfers of wealth: in reduction of the poverty rate in families
receiving child support, and in reduction of the poverty gap for those who are
still not lifted out of the zone of poverty. 191
Loss of emotional and social support is important, but the loss of income
and quasi-financial contributions is critical and severe. As three prominent
researchers of child support explain:
A wide body of social science theory suggests that increasing the
economic resources of custodial mothers will increase investments in
188. WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 78, at 124. The researchers disaggregated parental
incarceration from other potential destabilizing familial factors to find that at least two-thirds of the
effect on homelessness probability is driven by parental incarceration alone. Id. at 126-27.
189. See CLEAR, supra note 8, at 131 (brackets in quotation in original).
190. See, e.g., Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer & Eunhee Han, Child Support: Responsible
Fatherhood and the Quid Pro Quo, 635 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 140 (2011).
191. See id. (citing extensive literature).
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children ... There is also a growing body of empirical research linking
parents' economic resources to children's well being and reporting that
children who live in non-intact families are less successful than
children who live in intact families, and that much of the difference is
due to differences in income.' 
92
Of course, the degree to which parent's incarceration is harmful for his
children depends in part on what the parent-child relationship was like before• .. 193
incarceration. The severity of the impact of parental exit will vary upon a
number of factors, including:
[T]he age at which the parent-child separation occurs, length of the
separation, health of the family, disruptiveness of the incarceration,
child's familiarity with the placement or new caregiver, strength of the
parent-child relationship, number and result of previous separation
experiences, nature of the parent's crime, length of the parent's
sentence, availability of family or community support, and degree of
stigma that the community associates with the incarceration.
194
Yet as a whole, the disadvantage is significant even when the parent's
involvement prior to incarceration was not high. 195
The wounds of parental incarceration can cut extremely deep, as the
evidence above has shown, and the proposal for incarceration insurance is by
no means a panacea. At a minimum, however, incarceration insurance provides
much-needed dollars to plug the loss of income from incapacitation of a
parent's contributions from prison and from post-prison earnings reductions.
By providing the child with an upfront state subsidy, the immediate effects of
resource deprivation due to the exit of a parent to prison can be mitigated. In
addition, incarceration insurance stabilizes the child's home conditions by
lessening strains on their caregivers, thus alleviating another indirect cost of
192. Irwin Garfinkel, Sara S. McLanahan & Philip K. Robins, Child Support and Child Well-
Being: What Have We Learned?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 17-18 (Irwin Garfinkel,
Sara S. McLanahan & Philip K. Robins eds., 1994) (internal citations omitted). Though we may not
know how precisely child support payments are allocated when they are paid to children, there is
evidence to suggest that influxes to the child's custodial parent will increase his well-being. See also
Nazli Baydar & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, The Dynamics of Child Support and Its Consequences for
Children, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra, at 258-59. For a deep study of the ways
in which poor families headed by single mothers allocate scarce resources (including money from child
support), see generally EDIN & LEIN, supra note 72, at 22-23, 122. For an example of how poor children
and their parents negotiate scarce material goods against the backdrop of consumer culture's influence,
see generally CARL NIGHTINGALE, ON THE EDGE 147-50 (1993).
193. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 2; Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Effect of Parental
Incarceration on Young Children, NAT'L POL'Y CONF. (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. & The
Urban Inst., Wash. D.C.), Jan. 30-31, 2002, at 8.
194. Seymour, supra note 50, at 4.
195. See, e.g., Geller et al., Beyond Absenteeism, supra note 137, at 72.
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incarceration on children. In this manner, incarceration insurance can alleviate
the economic insecurity brought about by parental incarceration, and the
marginal effect of this stopgap measure can be significant. Section V spells out
some options for how much and in what form that plug should be-as well as
what a reasonable payback scheme would look like-but the bottom line is that
the severity of the resource gap indicates that some support is better than none
at all.
III. INCARCERATION INSURANCE
For incarceration insurance to successfully reduce childhood disadvantage,
the state must commit resources to fund the social insurance policy. This
section offers three normative justifications for why the state has the obligation
to provide social insurance in the form of parental incarceration insurance to
children.
The state has long provided social insurance for children and adults, though
there are gaps in its approach.196 The general justification for state-backed
social insurance rests on the understanding that an individual faces the risk of
economic insecurity at various points in the lifecycle. As Michael Graetz and
Jerry Mashaw explain, "It is this vision of our common fates-the intuition that
undergirds the common sentiment 'There, but for the grace of God, go I'-that
provides the most important moral foundation for universalistic social
insurance provision." 197 Social insurance serves as a bulwark against the risks
associated with temporary, episodic, or permanent losses in labor income. 98 In
the United States and in peer countries, social insurance covers a class of risks
that lead to income insecurity: illness and disability, old age, unemployment,
death of a family breadwinner, and childhood poverty.199 Social insurance for
children in particular has been conceptualized as a response to childhood as a
life-cycle risk. It targets childhood as "a period when [people] are expected-
indeed legally required-to be out of the workforce" 200 and vulnerable to
economic insecurity not within their control.
I argue that the state has an obligation to provide insurance against
economic insecurity for children. Section A argues for the obligation from a
theory about the moral status of children. Section B argues that the state has an
obligation to provide incarceration insurance as a way of internalizing costs of
mass incarceration that are currently pushed unfairly onto children generally
196. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 65 ("Children, who are three times as likely as the
elderly to be poor, have no federal entitlements program. They have no trust fund projections to catapult
their income security needs onto the national agenda.").
197. See id. at 27.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3.
200. Id. at 124.
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and minority children in particular. Section C argues for an additional reason
for the obligation on negative externality grounds, but focuses on the societal
spillover effects of parental incarceration.
20 1
A. The Moral Status of Children
Theorists of justice tend to presume that adults should be at least partially
responsible for their own fates. We cannot assume the same for children, who
are "not fully competent to determine and safeguard their own interests.,
20 2
Children deserve social insurance against economic insecurity generally
because they cannot choose their economic fates; they deserve incarceration
insurance specifically because the economic insecurity exacerbated by parental
incarceration makes these children especially unlucky.
Though he makes little mention of children specifically, Ronald Dworkin's
analysis of luck and insurance presents a good framework for evaluating
children's moral claims to incarceration insurance. Dworkin posits two forms
of luck: option luck, "a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn
out," and brute luck, "how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate
gambles."20 3 Child poverty fits into the category of brute luck because
"[c]hildren's actions are not implicated in their poverty."20 4 Some formulate
this as the risk of being unlucky enough to be "born into the wrong family."
20 5
Children are blameless in most regards, but particularly with respect to
their own economic security. The actions of the incarcerated parent, on the
other hand, are a fitting example of option luck from that parent's perspective.
The incarcerated parent most likely made a series of deliberate decisions that
201. The three normative justifications provided in this section are not exhaustive. For example,
some theorists and practitioners believe that the most important reason for public social insurance is
preserving moral dignity for the vulnerable because "[e]conomic insecurity damages self-respect and the
possibility of living in valued ways." Martha Holstein, A Normative Approach to Social Security: What
Dignity Requires, in SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 233, 234 (Leah Rogne, Carroll L. Estes
et. al., eds., 2009). The historical roots of Social Security as a project to secure "dignity in old age"
present the most striking example of this commitment. An alternate possible argument for incarceration
insurance is that it would be a thread in the fabric of a general social safety net, which must be
constructed because the state has an obligation to eradicate child poverty because it erodes the capacity
to actualize self-worth and dignity. Theories of a collective responsibility to support dignity are
plentiful; they span the gauntlet from Peter Singer's consequentialist argument for moral commitments
to alleviate suffering, see Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, I PHIL & PUB. AFF. 229-43
(1972), to the classic liberal argument espoused by John Rawls whereby dignity is a primary social good
that those in the original position would demand. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1971).
Cast in this light, programs like Social Security are not mere utilitarian risk-reduction schemes but rather
a moral collective effort by which "social citizens" fulfill their social obligations in an intergenerational
compact. Martin Kohli, Retirement and the moral economy, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AGING: THE
POLITICAL AND MORAL ECONOMY OF GROWING OLD 273 (M. Minkler & C. Estes eds., 1991); see also
Holstein, supra, at 246.
202. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEYOND BEST INTERESTS, supra note 147, at 3.
203. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73 (2000).
204. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 119.
205. Id. at 119 (referencing Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's characterization).
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carried known risks of incarceration, and the event of going to prison is option
luck odds playing out: as a losing hand. However, from the child's perspective,
parental incarceration is classic brute luck. There is essentially nothing that the
child can do to effect his fate vis-A-vis parental incarceration; the event is
visited on him like an earthquake or a car accident. There is a parallel between
being born with a serious handicap and being bom to a parent who goes to
prison: both are catastrophic, both are unpreventable by children, and neither
hinges on mere differences in taste.
Dworkin explains that insurance can provide "a link between brute and
option luck, because the decision to buy or reject catastrophe insurance is a
calculated gamble."20 6 He points out that there are instances in which people
cannot buy insurance for conditions they are born with or conditions that they
do not have funds or knowledge to insure against.20 7 Parental incarceration is
an apt example. Although some conditions labeled as handicaps may be
difficult to distinguish neatly from preferences and tastes, parental incarceration
risk is not one of them. Instead, it is a circumstance that merits compensation
from the public in order to "remedy one aspect of the resulting unfairness' 2°8 of
brute luck.
A thought experiment is helpful to explain why children require state
intervention in the context of both economic disadvantage generally, and in the
case of parental incarceration in particular. Imagine a newborn endowed with
the faculties of a rational decision maker standing with good information. That
prescient infant would buy insurance against a number of potential adverse life
events, including disability, illness, and unemployment. He would also insure
against having parents who are unable to provide the level of economic security
he needs. Specifically, he would want to insure against the loss of a caregiver
or resource provider.
If the prescient infant knows some basic facts about his place in society:
his race, class, geography, and family structure, and if he knows some of the
startling facts already explicated in previous portions of this paper, that child
would have a rational, informed basis on which to decide how much he should
pay for poverty insurance and for incarceration insurance. For a child of white
college professors, the premiums he would pay for both are probably very low
because the risk of his parents going to prison is minimal. On the other hand,
for an infant born to poor, young, unwed black parents in the Marcy Projects in
Brooklyn who did not finish high school, it may behoove him to pay a great
deal for the insurance.
Absurdity and reason intersect in this thought experiment. Everything
about the decision making calculus for our prescient infant makes sense, but
206. DWORKIN, supra note 203, at 74.
207. Id. at 77.
208. Id. at 81.
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there are no prescient infants; even if there were, they do not have the funds to
purchase the insurance.209 The agency problem is solved when a third party
steps in to do what the prescient infant would have done. The thought
experiment underscores the unique moral needs of the child, which is this
proposal's normative focal point. That childhood-among other biological
conditions in human life trajectories-are inevitable moments that require
dependency on others i  the theoretical basis for social insurance proposals.2 10
In a hypothetical world where social insurance comprehensively covers all
child poverty risk, there would be no economical-security basis for
incarceration insurance. In the real world, however, child poverty is a vastly
underinsured risk. 211 In the context of the Dworkinian insurance-risk analysis,
the relationship between childhood economic disadvantage and the specific
disadvantage of parental incarceration is one of degree and onset. As the
evidence in Part II demonstrates, parental incarceration is a trigger for
particularly severe economic insecurity. The proposal to insure against it
identifies that trigger as a criterion for a heightened form of social insurance
against child disadvantage.
Skeptics may argue that even if the state has an obligation towards child
well-being, it might not want to intervene if another party also has an obligation
212and can better do the task. Thus, perhaps the families of children could
purchase incarceration insurance.213  This is theoretically possible but,
practically speaking, infeasible for four major reasons. First, the cost of
incarceration insurance would be inversely correlated to the incomes of the
parents such that those whose children are most at risk have parents who are
least able to pay. Second, any pricing scheme would end up impermissibly
racially tiered, since incarceration rates hew so strongly along racial lines.
214
209. Indeed, as Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy observe, "a surprising number of state
interventions mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their
care," and these interventions are net welfare enhancing. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The
Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1988).
210. See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 119; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH 48 (2004).
211. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 112.
212. But see FINEMAN, supra note 210, at 47-49 (arguing that "caretaking work creates a collective
or social debt that each and that each and every member of society is obligated by this debt," and that
society freeriders on the work of caretakers). Fineman argues that a "just state" should provide subsidies
in the form of basic social goods, and also structure social and economic systems to "assume some fair
share of the burdens of dependency." Id. at 285, 287. Fineman's framework requires a radical resorting
of caretaking structures in society, but in the absence of this resorting, the current problem of a care and
resource gap created by parental incarceration still needs to be solved.
213. One permutation is that incarceration insurance could work like flood insurance, whereby
individuals can purchase protection from insurers, but FEMA provides backstop cost reduction in the
form of the National Flood Insurance Program.
214. If the insurer were to price premiums based on the average person's risk of having a parent go
to prison, the price might be low enough so that those at high risk of parental incarceration would buy
in. The insurers may go broke as a result. But if insurers price based on the high-risk kids, the premiums
would be astronomically high and many would be priced out of the market.
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Third, families may be reluctant to insure against incarceration for a whole host
of reasons, including trust-however misplaced-in their loved ones and fear
of stigma. Finally, the purchase of incarceration insurance would send
problematic signals; law enforcement may have reason to believe that a family
that buys incarceration insurance is likely to engage in law-breaking behavior.
Thus, the private actors implicated are especially unsuitable agents to enact
an ex-ante insurance scheme. This market failure problem is not unique to
incarceration, but is especially stark in this instance because it is the actions and
identities of parents-who might otherwise be insurance purchasers-that
precipitate the catastrophic event to be insured against. Thus, because a private
insurance market cannot operate effectively to protect children against parental
incarceration, and because the state does have an obligation to protect children
of incarcerated parents, the state must provide social insurance to cover them.
For comparable risks to children like parental disability or parental death,
there exist state-operated social insurance programs. The exit of a parent
through death or disability confers some of the same negative income effects on
children as parental incarceration.215 The U.S. government provides public
social insurance against the risk of the death of a family breadwinner through
Social Security survivor benefits.216 Both widowed spouses and survivor
children get benefits from deceased workers. In 2010, $105 billion worth of
payments were made from the Social Security survivor benefits program.217
Children of disabled parents also can receive support through Social Security
disability benefits or Supplemental Income disability benefits. Just as parental
disability is a brute luck event from the perspective of the child, so is parental
incarceration. The rationale behind providing these social insurance programs
for children suffering those risks addressed by SSDI and Survivor's Benefits
should extend to a salient risk for today's children: parental incarceration.
B. Rectifying Mass Incarceration's Harms to Children
A second and independent normative justification for the government's
obligation to provide incarceration insurance for children is on the grounds that
children bear a disproportionate amount of the cost of the state's punitive
incarceration policy. In identifying the state as a harbinger of parental
215. There are, of course, some differences even on the income deprivation dimension. Death-and
sometimes disability-are permanent removals of parental income, so the cumulative impact of these
exits are probably higher than most parental incarceration episodes (except life or death sentences).
However, incarcerated parents also impose costs on their families while in prison, which dead parents do
not. Finally, incarcerated parents have lower lifetime earning potential, while the families of deceased or
permanently-disabled parents do not suffer parallel consequences.
216. See MARMOR, MASHAW & PAKUTKA, supra note 22, at 101.
217. See id.
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incarceration risk and ascribing responsibility to it, 2Is I argue that the state must
redeem the negative externalities resulting from its deliberate enactment of a
regime of mass incarceration.
1. Government's Role in Exacerbating Parental Incarceration Risk
In all societies, children lose out on resources and support due to unequal
distribution not within their control. Parental incarceration is one of those
drivers of unequal distribution. Though the argument for incarceration
insurance applies to all children-in the United States or elsewhere, and
regardless of whether the parent is incarcerated for insider trading or for drug
trafficking-the U.S. government's role in increasing parental incarceration
risk for children creates a particularly strong obligation for this state. In no
other contemporary society is the magnitude of the problem so big, or its
development so deliberate. Because the United States' mass incarceration
regime219 is the reason why parental incarceration risk is so high for children
(especially poor black children), and because the cost of this regime has been
unduly placed on these children, the state has an obligation to provide
incarceration insurance.
This obligation rests on the uncontroversial premise that agents
promulgating a social policy should internalize the costs of the policy. In this
context, the state has not internalized the costs of mass incarceration; instead,
the costs are borne by children of incarcerated parents, who of course had no
role in enacting the policy. Indeed, these children are temporarily barred from
effecting any changes in the policy in the future, since children cannot vote.
Thus, the state's role-or at least its complicity-in creating outsized parental
incarceration risk compounds on its obligation to the innocent bearers of that
risk.
The claim that the state took deliberate action that increased the risk of
parental incarceration is not up for serious dispute. Not only has the American
state chosen incarceration as the solution to transgressions of the law, it has
also elected to use a particularly aggressive and totalizing way of incarceration.
This choice was not inevitable: prior to the 1970s, American criminal policy
situated prisons as a "back-up institution, infrequently used," and the political
campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s championing "law and order" triggered the
218. See Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Reentry As a Transient State Between Liberty and
Recommitment, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA, supra note 114, at 50, 79 (concluding
that growth in incarceration is not a consequence of growth in crime but rather policy decisions, as
partly evinced by variations in state policies and accompanying incarceration rates).
219. See Natasha A. Frost & Todd R. Clear, Understanding Mass Incarceration as a Grand Social
Experiment, in SPECIAL ISSUE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 159, 160-61
(Austin Sarat ed., 2009) ("[O]ur commitment to a policy of incarceration is now so entrenched that we
have created the problem of mass incarceration.").
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move towards penal reality today. 220 The shift occurred not as the result of a
particular unconscious or unexamined decision but rather as a purposeful
agenda, the crystallization of a continuous series of policies.221 Some contend
that the policy is "best understood as a grand social experiment," whereby the
"Punishment Imperative" pushed out all alternative responses to crime.2 2 It
was "a major change in social policy enacted in order to gain certain utilitarian
ends."
, 223
Virtually all evidence shows that the meteoric rise in prevalence of mass
incarceration and parental incarceration risk 224  was driven by the
administration of penal law by the state. As Marc Mauer explains,
88 percent of the tripling of the national prison population from 1980
to 1996 is explained by changes in the imposition of punishment (51
percent a greater likelihood of incarceration upon conviction and 37
percent longer prison terms), while changes in crime rates explain only
12 percent of the rise.225
The United States's law enforcement policies on drug crimes has thus
created what legal scholar Dorothy Roberts calls a "prisoner-generating
machine."226 Although many scholars critique these policy changes from a
number of fronts,227 I do not take up that project here. However, many
policymakers do recognize the empirical reality that a system that intensively
punishes drug crimes can be not only unfair, but also quite expensive.228 For
example, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, in urging the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to revise the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the average
sentence for drug trafficking crimes, noted that such a change would reduce the
220. See ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 46-53 (documenting the rhetoric and actions of Nixon and
Reagan in galvanizing crackdowns on crime).
221. See id. at 52-57 (describing the continuous path of federal policies pursuant to the War on
Drugs from the 1980s to the Clinton era).
222. Frost & Clear, supra note 219, at 161. They define grand social experiments by three
characteristics: aimed at a "pressing social problem," creates "a coalescence of political will and public
enthusiasm for a 'new approach,"' and "gains momentum as ... widely accepted." Id. at 163 (emphasis
removed). Other such experiments include the New Deal and the Great Society. Id. at 166-68.
223. 1d. at 161.
224. See supra Part II.A.
225. Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4, 6 (David Garland ed., 2001).
226. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2004).
227. There is near consensus amongst criminologists that "huge prison populations are a policy
error." CLEAR, supra note 8, at 176-77 (citing David Garland, Loic Wacquant, James Austin, John
Irwin, John Dilulio, and others scholars across methodologies).
228. Goffman also makes the point that aggressive stances to crime can generate more crime:
"Thus, the great paradox of a highly punitive approach to crime control is that it winds up criminializing
so much of daily life as to foster widespread illegality as people work to circumvent it. Intensive
policing and the crime it intends to control becomes mutually reinforcing. The extent to which crime
elicits harsh policing, or policing itself contributes to a climate of violence and illegality, becomes
impossible to sort out." GOFFMAN, supra note 27, at 199-200.
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federal prison population by 6,550 inmates and "help rein in federal prison
spending while focusing limited resources on the most serious threats to public
safety."'229
The instant proposal, however, looks beyond just budget costs. Whatever
benefits the state reaps from its criminal justice policy, 230 it does so partly on
the backs of poor children. This should make the obligation to pay these
children back especially persuasive. One could also be agnostic as to whether
there are actually social benefits from or a normative need for the mass
incarceration boom, but posit that the state nevertheless must properly account
for the fact that innocent children are bearing the costs of a failed policy
initiative. Although the failures and successes of this grand social
experiment are the subject of inquiry and debate,232 the question of whether
society is in fact better off as a result of the mass incarceration regime is
irrelevant to the question of whether the experiment imposes undue costs on
certain parties. The havoc it wreaks on children is disproportionate and unfair.
In addition to putting more parents in prison and incapacitating them from
contributing to their children's lives, the state also chose a regime that limits
the ability of the formerly incarcerated parent to contribute after they are
released. The formal barriers to employment, including shuttering access to
education training and public housing, were all constructed in tandem with the
mass incarceration strategy.233 Thus, the state not only is responsible for
deliberately putting more parents in prison, but also for reducing their ability to
contribute to the welfare of their children.
Incarceration insurance not only demands that the state redeem its history
of free-riding on disadvantaged children. It also requires that in the future, the
state must "put its money where its mouth is." Because the same entity that
decides who should go to prison, for what, and for how long would be the
entity that pays for the negative externalities of that policy, and it would also be
the same entity that stands to recoup that cost from the incarcerated parent
afterwards, finally the incentives can align. If the state would like to avoid
229. Attorney General Holder Urges Changes in Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Reserve
Harshest Penalties.for Most Serious Drug Traffickers, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFF.,
Mar. 13, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/March/I 4-ag-263.html.
230. For evidence that demonstrate that at least some reductions in crime rates can be attributed to
the growth of incarceration, see WESTERN, supra note 43, at 185 (noting that the crime drop in the 1990s
may be attributed to heighted incarceration, but that the effect is not particularly strong); William
Spellman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don't) Tell Us about Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME. &
JUST. 419 (2000); Don Stemen, Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime,
VERA INSTITUTE (2007), http://employees.oneonta.edu/ostertsf/Reconsideringlncarceration-
Veralnstitute.pdf.
23 1. For strong critiques of whether mass incarceration actually benefits social safety, see, for
example, ALEXANDER, supra note 28; Clear, supra note 8; Frost & Clear, supra note 219, at 177;
Western, supra note 21.
232. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 226; Pettit & Western, supra note 42.
233. See ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 56-57; Uggen, Wakefield & Western, supra note 80, at
237.
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paying too much, it can do one or both of two things: incarcerate fewer people,
or provide more opportunities for ex-inmates to earn wages to pay back into the
program. This places a burden on the state: it cannot wash its hands clean of the
negative externalities of its penal policy. It is only a "new" burden in the sense
that the state has ignored it in the past; it should have been borne by the state all
along.
2. The State's Obligation to Equality of Opportunity for Children
The previous sub-section argued that the picture of who gets incarcerated
in America demonstrates that the actions of a particular parent are only a partial
factor in the creation of incarceration risk for children; the state is at least as
complicit in creating and exacerbating parental incarceration risk. But beyond
creating an across-the-board higher risk of parental incarceration for all
children, the state also heightens the risk specifically for black and poor
children. To review, a black child born in 1990 with a parent with low
educational attainment has an over 50 percent chance of suffering the tragedy
of paternal incarceration, compared to 7 percent for white children generally. 234
The percent of black children suffering parental incarceration is ten times that
of white children.235 The racial disparity is also growing.
236
Calling on the state to rectify its "free-riding" on costs borne by children of
incarcerated parents does not have to require accounting for how those external
costs are racially distributed. However, that poor black children are the
overwhelming victims of these unaccounted-for costs is salient for two reasons.
First, this provides additional evidence that the state is culpable in creating
incarceration risk. Second, because mass incarceration's effects are more
severe for these children than for other children, the state has another
independent reason to provide incarceration insurance: because it needs to
provide equality of opportunity for children.
As Michelle Alexander argues, the penal regime in America can be
characterized as the "new Jim Crow" because it is not merely the fallout of a
racially neutral policy with racially disparate consequences, but rather the result
of deliberate discrimination through penal policies that target marginalized
groups.237 Alexander is not the first to raise the idea that mass imprisonment in
America is not the residual outcome of an even-handed criminal administration
regime. Loic Wacquant argued over a decade ago that the American prison
system is a "judicial ghetto," and in conjunction with the neighborhood ghetto,
234. See Wildeman, supra note 6, at 273.
235. See Wildeman & Western, supra note 53, at 162.
236. See Wildeman, supra note 6, at 271-80. Wildeman's research does show that not all of the
disparity is due to state-controlled factors; other factors include disparities between the age growth of
black versus white parents, and changes in marriage rates among blacks. Id.
237. See ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 182-83; 190-200.
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falls into the category of "peculiar institutions" that also encompasses chattel
slavery and Jim Crow; these systems aim to suppress, confine, and coerce the
black population.238 Wacquant furthers observes that what is commonly
referred to as mass incarceration is actually the "hyperincarceration of one
particular category, lower-class African American men trapped in the
crumbling ghetto," which leaves the rest of the masses "practically untouched"
and the regime largely untouched by political dissent. 239
Specific examples of racial disparity in the American criminal justice
system are a dime a dozen. The sources of these discriminatory practices are
myriad, but one is in police investigatory practices that yield racially skewed
results.240  Heavily-publicized examples include the events in Ferguson,
Missouri in August 2014 that is the subject of parallel FBI and Department of
Justice civil rights investigations,241 and the New York Police Department's
stop-and-frisk regime.242 Though the New York stop-and-frisk program has
finally been found unconstitutional and reforms are underway, generally
speaking racial profiling and racialized police tactics are far from eliminated. 243
There are scant legal protections against racial profiling in vehicle-related
searches and seizures in particular, as is made clear by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Whren v. United States that pretextual searches are constitutional.24 4
238. Loic Wacquant, The New 'Peculiar Institution': On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto, 4
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378, 383-85 (2000).
239. Loic Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DAEDALUS,
Summer 2010, at 78.
240. See ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at 66-72. See also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 331, 344-54 (1998) (providing empirical evidence to support the
proposition that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows disproportionate racial consequences).
241. Sari Horwitz, Carol D. Leonnig & Kimberly Kindy, Justice Dept. to Probe Ferguson Police
Force, WASH. POST (Sep. 3, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/justice-dept-to-probe-ferguson-police-force/2014/09/03/737dd928-33bc- I e4-a723-
fa3895a25d02_story.html; Mark Berman, FBI Opens Investigation Into Shooting of Michael Brown,
WASH. POST (Aug. 1I, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/08/1 1/fbi-opens-investigation-i nto-shooting-of-michael-brown/.
242. See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *562
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), appeal dismissed, Sept. 25, 2013 ("[T]he City adopted a policy of indirect
racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data. This has
resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and Hispanics in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."). The City has since agreed to settle the case on the terms outlined by Judge
Scheindlin in her opinion, and settlement is pending approval by District Judge Analisa Torres.
Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/20l4/01/31/nyregion/de-
blasio-stop-and-frisk.html. This settlement came after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals removed
Judge Scheindlin from Floyd and its companion case Ligon, and remanded to a new Southern District of
New York judge. ORDER, Ligon, et al. v. City of New York, et al.; Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et
al., 13-cv-3123; 13-cv-3008 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2013).
243. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZONA, DRIVING WHILE BLACK OR
BROWN 6-7 (2008), available at http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/
DrivingWhileBlackorBrown.pdf.
244. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also United States v. Ibarra, 345 F.3d 711, 714
(9th Cir. 2003) (upholding an extraordinarily pretextual search and noting that "Whren foreclosed the
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This is accompanied by the Court's disinclination to intervene in cases alleging
racial discriminatory policing.245 Thus, the entry point into the criminal justice
system has a racial filter, and this entry-point inequality yields downstream
inequalities.
The evidence presented in Part II shows that incarcerating a parent visits
negative consequences on their children. Discriminatory laws, policing
practices, and criminal administration together make black and poor children
much more likely than white children to experience parental incarceration.
Corroborating evidence includes new research showing that mass incarceration
is linked to widening disparities in child welfare between blacks and whites.
For example, had incarceration rates remained at 1973 levels, the decrease in
likelihood of infant mortality would be about fifteen percent for black children
and only about two percent for white children.246 In addition, mass
incarceration since 1973 was the factor that accompanied a "65 percent




The Dworkinian analysis in the previous section already provides a clear
rationale for why pursuing equality of opportunity for children is a moral
obligation of the state.248 Because children cannot choose to be born into a
certain race or class, life outcomes that are disproportionate on the basis of
those arbitrary lines should be avoided. But because the inequality of outcomes
in this particular instance are not merely driven by randomness, but rather by
the actions of the state in policing certain races in more draconian ways, the
state has an especially heightened burden to correct the inequity.
Through its policies and practices, the state pushes parents to exit. Its shove
is more forceful for black parents than white parents, and the fall's impact has
also become harder. The state has an obligation to all children; the obligation
extends to all children of incarcerated parents because incarceration is a
deprivation against which they need protection. The obligation is strengthened
by the state's complicity in creating the risk of that deprivation. But the state
also has a particularly strong obligation to the children of parents who are
unjustly targeted by the criminal justice system. These are parents who, given
an even-handed administration of criminal laws, would not have been
incarcerated to begin with, or would have received lower sentences. These are
possibility that a search or seizure may be invalidated solely because of the subjective intentions of the
officer").
245. See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012 Term, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV.
L. REv. 9, 63-64, n.310 (2013) (collecting cases on the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in racial
profiling cases where plaintiffs are seeking redress through both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause, even as Whren leaves open the possibility of courts forbidding race-selective
practices under the Equal Protection Clause).
246. WAKEFIELD & WILDEMAN, supra note 78, at 143.
247. Id. at 147.
248. See supra Part lII.A.
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children who, given a state with a more equal criminal justice system, would
not suffer such marked deprivations from parental incarceration.
For a host of reasons, it is functionally impractical to require that the state
provide more favorable insurance for children of black parents versus white
parents. However, providing incarceration insurance across the board alleviates
the problem of equality of opportunity because parental incarceration risk is so
much higher for black children. In other words, incarceration insurance will
benefit more black children than white children, but this outcome is exactly
right, because more black than white children suffer from heightened risk of
parental incarceration in the first place.
However, the equality-creating characteristic of incarceration insurance
should by no means be viewed as a justification for continuing a racialized
penal regime. Rather, it should be a starting point for the state to take an honest
look at its policies and its disparate treatment and effect on marginalized
communities, and to acknowledge that the New Jim Crow regime is not only an
injustice for those who get incarcerated, but also creates a society where
children begin on unequal footings as a result of perniciously asymmetric state
action towards their parents.
C. Social Impact of Mass Parental Incarceration
1. Addressing Social Harms
A separate, utilitarian perspective on parental incarceration is that the state
has an obligation to internalize the cost of its mass incarceration scheme: the
collective social negative externalities resulting from mass parental
incarceration. Parental incarceration exacerbates childhood disadvantage,
which in turn creates negative externalities for society. The state should correct
those negative externalities through incarceration insurance because it has an
interest in maximizing collective social welfare.
As demonstrated previously, parental incarceration reduces financial and
quasi-financial support and is in itself a destabilizing force in children's
socioemotional and physical well-being. Across numerous studies, children
with incarcerated parents have been found to experience more negative life
events, which cannot be expected to be contained within the family.
249
Incarcerating parents creates "a set of second-order problems that furthers
social detachment.' 25° Various long-term negative effects on children include:
"alcohol and substance abuse, behavior problems, attachment insecurity,
cognitive delays, academic failure, truancy, criminal activity, and adult
249. See CLEAR, supra note 8, at 117-18 (charting a summary of studies on the collateral
consequences of incarceration on families, children, the economy, and communities).
250. BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 221.
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conviction and incarceration.,251 While some children adapt and cope with the
trauma and disadvantage of parental incarceration, these net effects still
manifest in demonstrated negative outcomes.
As children are exposed to severe hardships stemming from parental
incarceration, the culmination of these factors results in a grave risk of
perpetuating negative societal consequences. Consequences such as school
performance declines, depression, aggression, and other problems resulting in
lowered chances of life success2 52 have spillover effects. Growing up in
economically depressed environments is a major risk factor for future criminal
involvement.2 53 Some studies show that incarceration has self-perpetuating
elements, including evidence that father absence and economic stress increase
the risk of youths' criminal involvement. 254 The connection between these bad
outcomes and public safety is almost certain. "It requires a stretch of logic to
think that concentrated incarceration . . . [is] a source of all of these
problematic neighborhood dynamics without affecting crime."2 55 Todd Clear
explains that incarceration creates social disorganization in neighborhoods by
destabilizing their foundations and thus creates recursive negative effects:
[H]igh rates of incarceration can destabilize communities in ways that
make them vulnerable to crime. The argument draws upon social
disorganization theory, which has long held that in areas where
residents are highly outwardly mobile, crime will flourish, because
those locations will lack the stable infrastructure that is required as a
foundation of informal social control.256
The utilitarian argument posits that these large, knock-on effects of
parental incarceration merit state intervention. Providing children of
incarcerated parents with economic resources to alleviate income insecurity
lowers the economic stress and promotes the likelihood of better outcomes for
these children. When society insures children against adverse outcomes, "the
251. Julie Poehlmann, Children of Incarcerated Mothers and Fathers, 24 Wis. J.L. GENDER &
Soc'Y 331, 336-37 (2009).
252. See CLEAR, supra note 8, at 101-03 (outlining various findings of negative outcomes for
children).
253. See id. at 109 (reviewing literature supporting the link between economic depression and
crime).
254. See DON WEATHERBURN & BRONWYN LIND, DELINQUENT-PRONE COMMUNITIES (2001)
(developing a thesis that economic stresses and poor parenting lead to crime); BRAMAN, supra note 9, at
90; Cynthia Harper & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration (Princeton Univ. Ctr.
for Research on Child Well-being Working Paper No. 99-03, 1999) at 33. Given the voluminous record
from decades of sociology research, is virtually indisputable that "high rates of incarceration destabilize
families, increase rates of delinquency, increase rates of teenage births, foster alienation of youth from
pro-social norms ... and weaken labor markets." CLEAR, supra note 8, at 173.
255. CLEAR, supra note 8, at 173.
256. Todd Clear, The Problem with Addition by Subtraction: The Prison-Crime Relationship in
Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 182.
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insured is not just the poor child or the poor family with children, but also the
society as a whole."257 Child poverty is a societal problem, as it is strongly
associated with "low levels of educational attainment and a substantially
increased likelihood of low productivity as an adult. Poor children are twice as
likely as non-poor children to repeat a grade in school, to be suspended, or to
drop out of high school.,,258 Because children with incarcerated parents are at
greater risk of poverty,259 the state has a stake in minimizing social welfare
losses stemming from this risk factor.
Childhood disadvantage conferred by mass parental exit through
incarceration can be understood as the clustering of individual devastations,
and these devastations have collective social consequences. Thus far, these
social consequences have not been taken into consideration by the state, but
they are a direct cost of the parental incarceration regime. Society has an
obligation to address the costs of parental incarceration, as it is a salient driver
of childhood disadvantage that inevitably turns into future social ills.
2. Netting Out Costs
The prevention of the harms above--even if partial--confers a utilitarian
benefit on society in reducing future economic insecurity, crime, and other
forms of adversity. However, the program of providing incarceration insurance
also comes at a cost to society. A conservative estimate of a $500 per year
payment to the 2.6 million children of incarcerated parents nationwide would
net to $1.3 billion. If formerly incarcerated parents pay back half of that per
year, the cost of the program, excluding administration outlays, is still
substantial at $650 million per year for the government.
The arguments in Parts A and B stem from moral status and equality-based
normative commitments and stand independent of the budgetary cost. This
section, however, analyzes whether the state's use of taxpayer dollars to
internalize negative social externalities nets out in favor of paying for
incarceration insurance.
One avenue toward answering this question is through the lens of children
as public goods. 260 As Gary Becker characterizes it, successful state provisions
to children can be seen as "investments" in children, who eventually become
future wage earners and taxpayers. Through this lens, instead of viewing the
257. NANCY FOLBRE, VALUING CHILDREN 179 (2010); GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 120.
258. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 120.
259. See supra Part II.C (providing empirical data demonstrating parental incarceration exacerbates
poverty).
260. But see GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 126. The authors caution against viewing
children as future workers, but instead posit that there is a "special stake in preventing childhood
poverty." Id. at 120. They note that "[c]hildren are leading current lives, not just preparing for some
future one." Id. at 126.
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family as atomistic units, children are "becom[ing] increasingly public goods"
and, correspondingly, "parenting becomes an increasingly public service."
26 1
Indeed, scholars have extended this to hold the view that "[t]hose who benefit
from children's future income do so partly at the expense of present-day
parents" and conclude that parenting should be viewed as a public good as
262well. In this conception, incarceration insurance is not a burden on the public
but an investment that plugs into the gap where the public service investment of
parents have failed. Investing in incarceration insurance can confer social
benefits by preventing particular harms on children's well-being. Since parental
incarceration poses a particular threat to the likelihood that children of
incarcerated parents will not reach a maximum level of social productivity and
income-earning, investments in counteracting that threat should be evaluated in
terms of future returns.
A salient example of this argument is compulsory public education, which
is of course funded by the state. An upfront investment in children's welfare
also confers long-term benefits on society. As long as the present value of the
future contribution of children on a marginal basis exceeds the cost of insuring
them, the payoff is net positive for society.263 Cast in this light, social policies
that involve wealth transfers to children are not just that; they are better
characterized as investments in these children's future well-being and wealth-
creation potential, which in turn bolsters societal welfare.
264
Furthermore, the damage to children's well-being through parental
incarceration can wreak havoc in the "returns" on the investment that he state
265makes in other child-welfare programs, such as education and health. Thus,
incarceration insurance can also be thought of as a second-order "meta-
insurance" of the effectiveness of general social insurance for children. The
future returns of this investment are difficult to calculate, particularly because
its results will likely depend on how the insurance program is implemented.
However, in thinking through the costs and benefits to society of taking on this
incarceration risk program, the future payoff value of the program is important
to keep in mind.
261. FOLBRE, supra note 257, at 86.
262. Id. at 87. See also FINEMAN, supra note 210, at 47-48 (though Fineman's argument that
society owes a collective social debt to caretakers does not hinge on viewing children as social goods).
263. GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14 (1993).
264. For a preliminary discussion of potential ways to calculate the return on investment in early
childhood education and child health initiatives, see FOLBRE, supra note 257, at 180-81.
265. This does not require holding the view that children are social goods, but merely that social
investments should be allocated efficiently.
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IV. DEFINING PARENTAL OBLIGATION
A. Why Parents Must Pay
The state has an obligation to provide for child welfare in response to
parental incarceration, but the proposal does not require that the state go it
alone. The proposal requires the state to provide upfront social insurance to
children of incarcerated parents, and also requires the incarcerated parent to
contribute. By ushering the state to step in, but also by linking the parental
obligation to pay for incarceration insurance with the notion of parental
responsibility, this proposal aims to resolve the tension between the goal of
bolstering economic security for children and the "widely held and sensible
beliefs concerning parental responsibility.
'" 266
First, the proposal requires inmate parents to eventually contribute because
incarceration does not erase parental duty. Though incarceration incapacitates
the parent from fulfilling some of his parental duties, the parent still has
obligations to his children. One reason is that incarceration does not-and
should not-terminate parental rights. Insofar as the parent has an ongoing
future stake in his child's life, he must also uphold the responsibilities that
come along with that stake. As Lawrence Mead states in his argument for
work-based entitlements,
The idea is that parents are responsible in some sense for themselves
and the families they have brought into being . . . While individuals
make claims for sustenance through politics and their own labors, they
must also contribute to a reservoir of resources, both economic and•- 267
moral, shared by all the citizens.
The instant proposal seeks to make those responsibilities reasonable to
fulfill. However, the parent should not be able to abdicate responsibility while
maintaining parental status.
In addition, the parent's choice to commit crime makes him complicit in
the creation of disadvantage to his child. Though the distribution of criminal
sanctions can be uneven, the criminally-involved parents are not free of
parental obligation generally, or of the embedded obligation to reverse the
harms resulting from incarceration to the children. This comports with what
Dworkin calls option-luck, even if for some parents the menu of options is
more restricted than for others. Many similarly situated parents choose not to
commit crimes, and their actions provide the ultimate "insurance" for their
266. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 10.
267. LAWRENCE MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 244, 246 (1986).
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children against the harms of parental incarceration.268 Regardless of what
factors motivate parents to commit crimes, incarcerated parents know that their
actions might incur consequences for their children. It seems unjust and
strange, therefore, to absolve these individuals of any responsibility for creating
this risk. Instead, the parent should internalize some of the costs of
incarceration that are currently borne by his children.
Another important rationale for mandating contribution from the inmate
parent is equity. Insofar as the non-incarcerated parent or relative retains
responsibility for providing for the children, it is unfair to release incarcerated
parents from contributing. The remaining parents must "face the dual
challenges of working in the paid labor market and being the primary parent
and child caretaker" as well as the "extremely limited availability of public
support.' 269 If parents who do not engage in criminal activity are expected to
make large outlays to providing for child well-being, it is unquestionably
inequitable to release criminally involved parents from responsibility. 270
B. Impact on Inmates
Many incarcerated parents are already poor and face tremendous
disadvantages.27 1 Despite the fact that they maintain the obligation to provide
for their children, a proposal to impose further burdens on incarcerated inmates
should still be scrutinized from the perspective of impact on the inmate. The
following sections evaluate what form this program would take in the context
of the inmate parent's position.
1. A Change to the Current Child Support Regime
In most states, child support accrues against incarcerated parents even
though they cannot possibly pay while in prison. The instant proposal replaces
the child support orders for incarcerated parents, thus making little to no
268. For examples of the life-paths of members of high-crime communities who do not pursue
criminal activity, see GOFFMAN, supra note 27, at 163-85, 193-94.
269. Cancian, Meyer & Han, supra note 190, at 143.
270. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the non-incarcerated parent). From an empirical standpoint, it
is not clear that parents who exit from their parental obligations through prison or otherwise end up
worse off than their children. In the child support context, "there is some evidence that on average,
nonresident fathers are better off than resident mothers and their children." Id. (citing data that 15 to
25% of nonresident fathers are below poverty while 27% to 46% of resident mothers fall below the
poverty line, but noting that there may be selection bias in the sample). Of course, incarceration is a
brutal experience, so there may of course be differences between incarcerated parents' and noncustodial
parents' socioeconomic outcomes.
271. See Western & McLanahan, supra note 64, at 312 ("Incarceration is a watershed event that
can disrupt key life course transitions setting in motion a downward spiral of accumulating
disadvantage."); BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 154 ("Many inner-city families not only experience
incarceration because they are poor, but they are also poor because they experience incarceration.").
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difference in some inmates' accrual of obligations.272 Thus, for at least some
inmate parents, the instant proposal is a net positive in that their children
receive actual wealth transfer today, but the obligation against the parent is not
substantively different than before.
Making incarcerated parents accrue child support arrears without providing
anything to the children is ineffective in bolstering child well-being.273 It is
estimated that "[f]athers typically enter prison with $10,000 child support debt
and leave owing $20,000 or more."274 Though in some states parents can
reduce their orders while in prison, few know about the options, and even fewer
use them successfully.275 These parents accrue arrears that are levied against
them when they get out, but their children receive no benefits. As one advocacy
organization put it:
When an incarcerated parent has no assets, setting child support orders
at pre-incarceration levels will not tangibly support the child. All this
will do is create arrears that cannot be collected. This has negative
consequences for the noncustodial parent and the State ... Ultimately,
these child support debts are not in the best interest of the child.276
The instant proposal replaces the ineffective child support obligation for
the incarcerated parent, instead providing their children with usable resources
during the duration of the parent's prison term. When combined with
reasonable and thoughtful reentry programs as well as parenting resources, this
program should make it easier, not harder, for inmates to provide for their
children relative to the status quo.
2. Countering Parental Alienation
A second way in which incarceration insurance can impact the experience
of prison for the incarcerated parent is that the payments provide a structural
272. Whether the financial burden of this program is similar to that of child support depends on
particular program design, implementation, and the circumstances of the individual parent.
273. See Office of Child Support Enforcement, Incarceration, Reentry and Child Support Issues:
National and State Research Overview, U.S. Dep't. of Health & Hum. Serv. (2006)
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/incarceration-report.pdf; Esther Griswold &
Jessica Pearson, Twelve Reasons .for Collaboration Between Departments of Correction and Child
Support Enforcement Agencies, CORRECTIONS TODAY (June 2003).
274. VICKI TURETSKY, STAYING IN JOBS AND OUT OF THE UNDERGROUND: CHILD SUPPORT
POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE LEGITIMATE WORK 1 (2007).
275. Many states do not allow child support order modification on the basis of incarceration
because it is considered voluntary unemployment. For a full analysis of state approaches to reductions
based on incarceration status, see Jessica Pearson, Building Debt While Doing Time: Child Support and
Incarceration, 43 JUDGE'S J. 4 (2004).
276. Brief for The Center on Fathers, Families & Public Policy and The Wisconsin Council on
Children & Families as Amici Curiae, at 6, In re the Marriage of Toni L. Rottscheit v. Terry L. Dumler,
No. 01-2213 (Wisc. June 25, 2003).
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link between the incarcerated parent and his children that can combat parental
distancing. Disruptions in parents' life can have profound effects for their
relationships with their children, and prison is no different. As Edin and Nelson
note in their ethnography of inner-city poor fathers, few describe children as
"millstones" but most see them as "life preservers, saviors, redeemers."277 Yet
incarceration stakes a wedge between the ideal of parenting and reality. It not
only makes it difficult for parents to provide for their children, but also alters
their conceptions of parenthood.2 78
Both because of the totalizing power of the prison and because of
confrontation with parental failure, prisoner parents often experience an acute
displacement and distortion of their fatherhood identities and shirk from
continuing or establishing parental ties. 279  Ethnographic accounts have
demonstrated that for many parents, the displacement and detachment triggered
by incarceration prevent them from engaging in parenting roles after their
release from prison. 28  Incarceration insurance may alleviate some of these
effects, first by reassuring incarcerated parents that their children are being
provided for, and second by linking them to the welfare of their children
through the deferred payment obligation.
Many parents in prison wish that they could be providing for their children
and worry that their children are suffering from the loss of support.281 Anne
Nurse's 2002 study of incarcerated young black fathers found that these men-
even though their contributions to the welfare of their children prior to
confinement was small-held visions of the "good father" as someone who
"provides guidance, love and financial support to his children."2 82
277. EDIN AND NELSON, supra note 83, at 58. The researchers note that few complaints about child
support surfaced, and "the strength of the sentiment behind these fathers' words makes them all the
more remarkable."
278. EDIN AND NELSON, supra note 83, at 173.
279. See ARDITTI, supra note 79; NURSE, supra note 16; BRAMAN, supra note 9.
280. See ARDITTI, supra note 79.
281. Limitations on families' abilities to visit inmate parents can exacerbate this issue. Many
inmates go to prisons far away from their families, making visits nearly impossible. For example, female
prisoners are often concentrated in one prison, and are geographically isolated from their home cities.
Federal prison are often hundreds of miles from the communities where the prisoners' families live.
Though there have been efforts to reform prison visitation, some of these reforms have met setbacks. For
a recent review of visitation policies across the U.S., see Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz & Aaron Littman,
Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty State Survey, Y.L. & POL'Y. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Liman/PrisonVisitationPolicies-A-Fifty-State-Survey.pdf.
One of the ironic setbacks to visitation reform comes in the form of replacing physical visit access with
"Skype visits," which are fundamentally different from in-person visits and could be inaccessible to
many families without ready access to computers and intemet networks. See Robert McCoppin, Video
visits at Illinois jails praised as efficient, criticized as impersonal, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 12, 2014)
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-1 2/news/ct-jail-video-visits-met-20140112-_inmates-and-
visitors-video-visitation-john-howard-association.
282. NURSE, supra note 16, at 73. But see Monika J. U. Myers, A Big Brother: New Findings on
How Low-Income Fathers Define Responsible Fatherhood, 34 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 253 (2013)
(contending that other accounts of fatherhood might overemphasize financial contribution in what
fathers think of as hallmark fatherhood duties).
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Inmates sometimes express deep regret about not being able to provide for
their children, and that regret can transform into detachment, which wreaks
even more havoc on any fragile relationships these parents might have with
283their children. As one inmate parent put it, "[I regret] not being a good father
while in prison. I'm not really helping at all."284
There are two mechanisms by which parental detachment can take place.
First, parents may face despondency when they learn of financial difficulties
that their families face in their absence.2 85 "Financial difficulties faced by their
families figure largely in the concern of many of these men since a majority of
them contributed in some fashion to the finances of their families prior to
• .. ,,286
incarceration. There are numerous ethnographic accounts of inmates
lamenting the inability to provide for their families emotionally or otherwise.8 7
In interviews with 181 inmate parents in England, researchers found that these
parents often used the vocabulary of defeat when describing how they felt
about their incarceration's impact on their children: 15 percent said "gutted,"
20 percent said "helpless", and 8 percent said "frustrated.,288 In a different
study, an inmate mother noted this incapacitation as a reason for detachment:
"It's so hard to write my kids. There's nothing to write but bad things."
289
Tripp's study found evidence of parental detachment as a result of helplessness,
as "participants spoke of fatherhood in relation to their ability to purchase or
provide financially for their children." Nine of the twelve African-American
parents volunteered their inability to provide financial support as a major
problem and many discussed at length their families' financial woes as result of• • .290
or in concurrence with their imprisonment.
A second and more nuanced mechanism by which fathers in particular may
engage in distancing is that a major element of their fatherhood identity has
been stripped away and replaced by an inmate identity. 91 Fathers in prison
often base "elements of their father identity on their ability to provide
financially for their children or on their ability to purchase gifts for their
283. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 94; Brad Tripp, Incarcerated African American Fathers:
Exploring Changes in Family Relationships and the Father Identity, in IMPACTS OF INCARCERATION ON
THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILY, supra note 105, at 17, 25-27 (chronicling similar sentiments in other
inmates).
284. ARDITTI, supra note 79, at 77.
285. See Tripp, supra note 283, at 28.
286. Miller, supra note 105, at 5.
287. See BRAMAN, supra note 9, at 110-1 I, 124-25, 141, 146; Tripp, supra note 283, at 25-28.
288. GWYNETH BOSWELL & PETER WEDGE, IMPRISONED FATHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 39
(2002).
289. Lynn Sametz, Children of Incarcerated Women, 25 SOC. WORK 298, 299 (1980).
290. Tripp, supra note 283, at 28.
291. Some scholars and advocates have also critiqued the "deficit model" of adolescent parenthood,
arguing that it sets up an expectation ex ante that excludes young fathers "from involvement in parenting
fromt he start." J. Lyn Rhoden & Bryan E. Robinson, Teen Dads: A Generative Fathering Perspective
Versus the Deficit Myth, in GENERATIVE FATHERING: BEYOND DEFICIT PERSPECTIVES 105, 108 (Alan J.
Hawkins & David C. Dollahite eds., 1997).
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children.",292 But when they cannot do so, that pre-inmate identity is slowly
eroded and replaced with an identity shaped by their new everyday reality.
Sociologists document the effect as "prisonization,' '293 turning on the loss of
agency and perspective while in confinement.294 This prison identity is an
involuntary alteration.295 The loss of "self worth and competence that comes
with parenting" accompanies a gradual shift from the fatherhood identity to the
prisoner identity. 296
The detachment exhibits itself in downplaying parental responsibilities,
and is a particularly "troubling facet of incarceration" because it isolates
prisoners "from an important source of support during the incarceration
process," as it creates "minimization of the father role in these inmates' sense
of themselves" and can lead to degradation that "may decrease these men's
level of motivation to act as fathers after imprisonment."' 297 This may
exacerbate the already fraught relationship between the inmate father and the
child's mother. The Fragile Families data show that fathers released from
prison are "50% more likely to have no relationship with their baby's mother a
year after the birth" versus never-incarcerated men.
298
Despite the evidence of detachment, there are also plenty of signs that men
in prison are still committed to the idea of parenting.299 Some parents try to do
everything they can while in prison, such as pushing for visits and writing cards
and letters. In describing their fatherhood roles, inmates often used an "action
orientation," describing specific performances like gift-giving on holidays.
300
Thus, insofar as parenting actions are possible, there is some room for
maintaining parenting identity. Indeed, ethnographers find that fatherhood
'identities sometimes lie dormant during the prison term instead of disappearing
entirely.
30 1
Of course, assuring incarceration insurance payments to children will not
wholly counteract the effects of helplessness and of "prisonization." The power
292. Tripp, supra note 283, at 25.
293. See C. Newton, Gender Theory and Prison Sociology: Using Theories of Masculinities to
Interpret he Sociology of Prisons for Men, 33 HOWARD J. 193 (1994).
294. See ARDITTI, supra note 79, at 36.
295. Id. at 76.
296. Id. at 35. Arditti furthers, "[P]risonization involves the individual's inculcation of the prison
subculture so much so that preprison identities 'fade' and the prison identity of 'inmate' ascends." Id. at
74 (internal citations omitted). See also Wm. Justin Dyer, Prison, Fathers and Identity: A Theory o
How Incarceration Afects Men's Paternal Identity, 3 FATHERING 201, 202 (2005).
297. Tripp, supra note 283, at 28-29.
298. Western & McLanahan, supra note 64, at 318-19.
299. There is also evidence that young fathers are particularly likely to exhibit detachment, whereas
older parents are more likely to repair severed bonds or maintain relationships. See Edin, Nelson &
Paranal, supra note 90.
300. Id. at 25-26.
301. See ARDITTI, supra note 79.
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of the prison as a totalizing institution is great.302 However, the payments can
make a difference in combating parental distancing, hence contributing to more
contact while the parent is in prison and more of an impetus to continue
parenting when released. That he payment is linked to the specific parent is
critical because it creates a way for the incarcerated parent to feel that he is
providing for his child. This is important because it drives a wedge-even if it
is a small one-against the totalizing perceptive shift towards prisonization by
maintaining a semblance of the inmate's sense of the self as a parent. 3o3 While
it is possible that some inmate parents may resent the mandatory repayment
scheme, the fact that their children received tangible benefits during their
incarceration may inspire some to believe that their incarceration was not all
bad for their children. And to the extent that the incarcerated parent is expected
to-and believes that he may-eventually pay back the costs, the incarcerated
parent may be induced to feel like he has a stake in the welfare of his child.
This stakeholder mentality might buttress the foundational parental identity that
304would spur support when the parent emerges from prison. This is important
both in itself and also has recursive effects, as male parolees who have family
networks and who return to living with their children and partners are less
likely to reoffend.3 °5
C. Impact on the Non-Incarcerated Parent
Incarceration insurance affects not only children and their incarcerated
parents, but also the non-incarcerated parent or caretaker. Amongst young
black men without high school diplomas, "more become incarcerated than
either go on to attend college or hold a job. 3 °6 They leave behind a significant
population of their children and their children's caretakers-usually mothers
307
and grandmothers. These caretakers bear the responsibility of caring for
302. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 1-125 (1966). See also CLEMMER, supra note
130.
303. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 94-95 (noting that "maintain[ing] incarcerated parents' self-
perception as parents . . . can benefit both the incarcerated parent and his or her children . . . [by]
foster[ing] childhood development and serve as a rehabilitation tool for parents.").
304. For example, Edin and Nelson conclude their detailed new ethnography of inner city poor
fathers by suggesting that broad policies that promote "ongoing involvement" from poor fathers could
focus them towards their children's well-being, including "stav[ing] off additional childbearing with
new partners and leav[ing] fewer children on the father-go-around." EDIN & NELSON, supra note 83, at
228.
305. ARDITTI, supra note 79, at 90.
306. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 260 (2003).
307. See, e.g. Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note
104, at 117, 128 (noting that because in certain neighborhoods, because so many men are in prison,
"[t]he fact that men and women both perceive a significant shortage of eligible men shapes the way they
approach relationships in troubling ways").
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children without support while the other parent is incarcerated. Incarceration
insurance will have a large impact on them.
I have already described the ways in which adult family members of the
incarcerated-in particular the partners and mothers of incarcerated fathers-
bear outsized burdens in the wake of their imprisonment. Support to these
families will alleviate some of the burdens, primarily by enlarging the meager
pools of resources that the family must share.
Incarcerated individuals tend to be poor.308 Their families do worse
economically as a result of their departure.309 The support that incarceration
insurance can bring to these families-and especially to the non-incarcerated
parent who is responsible for taking care of the child-can be dramatic.
Accounts of poor single mothers' resource deprivation and daily dilemmas
suggest that a subset of. these single mothers-those who lose a partner to
prison-are equally in need of support. Edin and Lein's ethnographic research
revealed that poor single mothers lived "significantly below what most
Americans would think an adequate standard.,310 They found that these
families "regularly went without items that virtually every American would
consider necessities"311 such as housing, medical care, food, and winter
clothing.312 In their exploration of how these single mothers "make ends meet"
with welfare and low-income jobs, they found that for many, "child support
was the single most important factor allowing them to work at a low-wage
job., 313 Another common concern was safe and adequate childcare, the lack of
which often prevented single mothers from earning an income.314 Since inmate
parents cannot meaningfully contribute child support or childcare, a corollary
economic support mechanism needs to be in place to support these families.
315
One might ask whether the non-incarcerated parent might also be
considered complicit in incarceration risk-creation. The short answer to this
question is no. There are structural problems with assigning responsibility to
the non-incarcerated parent, one of which is that it is hard to predict which
potential mates are prison-bound and which are not. While some individuals
may have some idea of the ex ante risk that the other parent of their children
has certain propensities for criminal behavior, the obligation to prevent this
outcome is too attenuated, especially if these individuals have children while
308. See Pettit & Western, supra note 42.
309. See supra Parts li.B & II.C.
310. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 72, at 47.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 48-56.
313. Id. at 122.
314. Id. at 133-35.
315. Part ll.B.2 describes the many economic stressors associated with a spouse or partner going to
prison. However, there are also accompanying socioemotional stressors that come from raising a family
while one's partner is in prison. While incarceration insurance cannot directly address noneconomic
concerns, alleviating the pressure of poverty will likely diminish the acuteness of socioemotional
stressors on single parents as they raise children in the shadow of a partner's incarceration.
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they are themselves young, or if the criminal behavior in their partners does not
manifest until after the child is born. But most importantly, it is likely that this
parent is already bearing much of the uncaptured costs of child-rearing while
the other parent is in prison, and even a robust incarceration insurance program
would only partially make up for that additional burden.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS
So far, we have explored the theoretical justifications underlying the
proposal for incarceration insurance. The contours of the proposal's
programmatic design, however, have not yet been discussed. This Part aims to
define those contours in three sections. Section A refocuses the theoretical
discussion towards the schematic of social insurance design and explains why
the concern for the well-being of children of incarcerated parents should
translate to this particular program for incarceration insurance. Section B
explains why this specific scheme is the only one that adequately addresses the
problem of collateral consequences on children due to parental incarceration.
Section C maps out a matrix of programmatic options for implementation,
including questions such as how the payments should be made, whether it
should count against other public benefits, how much the incarcerated parent
should pay, what programs should be available to encourage payment, and
what enforcement mechanisms there should be for non-payers.
A. Incarceration Insurance as Social Insurance
I call my proposal "incarceration insurance," but note that it is both
technically and substantially distinct from the traditional and commonly-
understood notion of private insurance. Insurance typically involves a party
paying an ex ante fee in return for compensation in case of a specified event.
My proposal does not require the insured party to pay ex ante. There are two
reasons for this difference. First, the degree to which the government controls
the level of incarceration risk is higher than for many other insured risks, such
as risk of disease or auto accidents. Second, the insured party in this situation
has no control over the likelihood of the catastrophic event, and also cannot pay
for it. The "fee" paid to the government as insurer is ex post, and thus at first
glance, the proposal looks like a loan from the government to the incarcerated
parent. But the goal of the program is not to issue loans, but rather to share the
burden of the "fee" between the two responsible parties.316 The program's
316. One implementation option, discussed in Part V.C.3, is to charge the parent the would-be
average premium for the whole program, versus the premium for the pool of those at high risk for
incarceration.
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ultimate goals are the same ones that drive many other social insurance
programs: providing protection against risks of adverse life events.
That programs labeled as social insurance do not hew to traditional notions
of ex ante insurance premiums for later coverage is not new or surprising.317 In
the realm of governmental social insurance, the link between an individual
party beneficiary and the payment of an ex ante fee for protection is not crucial.
For example, unemployment insurance is financed through employer taxes, and
the unemployed individual collects the claim from the government. Thus, the
employer never tailors the "fee" it pays to any particular employee, instead
factoring in the cost of the program within its projections of the cost of
hiring.318 The unemployed person is paid out of a funding pool. We
nevertheless define the program as a social insurance program because its
intention is to insure people against the risk of losing their jobs.
Similarly, I call this program "incarceration insurance" because the goal of
the program is to insure against a specified risk. The risk is viewed from the
perspective of the child. The proposal separates the payer of insurance from the
beneficiary of the insurance; this separation is based on the obligations theories
discussed in Part III. Put simply, the obligation to pay does not rest on the
children because they are not involved in risk creation. Rather, two
constituencies-the state and the parent-have obligations to protect children
from risk bear the burden, and the proposal institutes a cost-sharing mechanism
from them both. Incarcerated parents eventually pay the government "back" to
sustain the funding for the program, unlike pure entitlement programs that do
not require any payment from beneficiaries or their families. As long as the
mechanisms for delivering the insurance are effective and justified, the fact that
they may not look like traditional insurance is irrelevant.
B. The Policy Landscape
This proposal is the first to link the problem of mass incarceration's
collateral consequences on children to a social insurance program for those
children. Other policy proposals, while recognizing a state obligation towards
child welfare generally, have aimed to ameliorate childhood disadvantage from
other angles without addressing the source of the problem directly. As I
indicated in Part 1, existing, conventional mechanisms, such as TANF and
Social Security, do not adequately cover the disadvantage conferred onto
children by their parents' incarceration. Even measures targeted at children
317. For a discussion on the distinction between private insurance and social insurance, see
GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 26-28, 42-43.
318. States do usually require employers who lay off more workers to pay a higher unemployment
insurance payroll tax, but this is still not directed at any particular worker. See MARMOR, MASHAW &
PAKUTKA, supra note 22, at 140.
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specifically, such as child-only TANF, do not actually protect against the
specific risk of parental incarceration. In order to receive child-only TANF, the
recipient must be living with caretakers who do not otherwise qualify for
TANF. 319 At most, it is a recourse for the child whose two parents are both
unable to provide for her through TANF or otherwise. If we imagine a child
whose father is incarcerated and whose mother is her caretaker but has lost
TANF benefits, Child-only TANF is a stopgap for the mother's income
contribution, but does not directly address the lost income from the incarcerated
parent.
When we look to the universe of proposed solutions, even the innovative
child-welfare plans are not sufficient to address harm specifically accruing to
children of incarcerated children. An example of a pioneering policy proposal
for children is Irwin Garfinkel's child support assurance system (CSAS), which
would guarantee a minimum child support payment funded by the government.
While the expectation is that the noncustodial parent would provide a standard
rate of child support, the government would make up for the difference if the
parent does not pay. 320 This proposal is a more expansive view of the insurance
problem for parental exit, but in the context of parental incarceration, there are
two problems. First, many children with incarcerated parents do not have
established child support orders and thus will not be covered by this program.
Second, CSAS does not require payment from the noncustodial parent, which
means there is a risk is that the compensation provided is over-inclusive and
thus displaces parent-to-child transfers for those parents who can, but don't,
pay full child support if they know the government will make up the gap. The
program may also be too expansive for strained budget realities, and may create
incentives for fraud--or at least perceived potential for fraud. While Garfinkel
makes excellent arguments for why CSAS is more effective towards alleviating
childhood inequality than child support enforcement in the status quo, and
points out that CSAS in fact may be cost-neutral in the long run, the instant
proposal pinpoints the one form of parental exit covered under the umbrella of
CSAS that is most critical for government backstop.
Other child welfare ideas, such as Anne Alstott's proposal for caretaker
resource accounts321 and Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw's proposals322 for
wage supplements, childcare and housing subsidies, and increased survivorship
benefits, are beneficial for children and their primary caretakers. But once
again, they cannot account for the losses of support that arise specifically from
parental incarceration. Alstott and Bruce Ackerman's stakeholder society
319. OLIVIA GOLDEN & AMELIA HAWKINS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. TANF CHILD-
ONLY CASES (Jan. 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/childonly.pdf.
320. See GARFINKEL, supra note 24, at 8. This program was implemented as a pilot program in
Wisconsin and, to a limited extent, in certain counties in New York State.
321. See ALSTOTT, supra note 1, at 73-137.
322. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23.
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proposal323 aims to resolve much of the equality-of-opportunity problem that
motivates the need for social insurance, but by the time individuals reach the
age to receive their stake, they will have borne many of the negative
consequences of deprivation, some of which may be irreversible. For example,
the results of the ACES study would suggest that even though one can progress
out of poverty, childhood stressors like poverty have lasting consequences for
the long-term health of the individual. These consequences could only be partly
mitigated by receiving a stake upon becoming an adult, but it also means that
not every stake-receiver starts off on equal footing. A social insurance model
that intervenes to dissolve lines of inequality early on would provide a unique
benefit and would be compatible with other policies. In sum, there are
numerous innovative and helpful proposals that can supplement the instant
proposal in generally increasing resources for children who need and deserve
them, but these proposals do not plug the gap created by parental incarceration
specifically.
C. Program Implementation
The core elements the foregoing program upon which all of the theoretical
discussion is based thus far only require that the government provide a non-
means-tested incarceration insurance payment upfront, that the incarcerated
parent be obliged to contribute at least some portion of the cost, and that this
contribution displace the accrual of child support obligations for the duration of
the parent's prison term. This section explores a number of implementation
decisions for structuring an incarceration insurance program designed to benefit
children.
Embedded in these recommendations is a critique of existing policies on
child welfare. While some recommendations may be too radical to pass
political muster everywhere, even if not all of these program details are
adopted, a basic incarceration insurance scheme is better than none at all. If we
recognize that the state does indeed have obligations to provide for children of
incarcerated parents, we must also recognize that there are full and partial ways
of fulfilling the obligation. Because no such program has ever existed before, I
caution that many design details outlined below are postulates and
considerations for optimal policy, not proscriptions. In some, I note that the
"right" answer is more elusive, and provide only hypotheses for what a
successful program might look like.
Practically speaking, it is unlikely that incarceration insurance would be
implemented on a national level. This means that any enactment that occurs on
the local and state levels in the form of pilot programs should pay attention to
323. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
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these programmatic design options and to structure their programs to inform
best practices and effective alternative implementation options.
1. Initiation
The insurance could be initiated by a number of parties, including the other
parent, family members, social workers, or the state itself. As long as the child
has a legal parent who is incarcerated, the program kicks in. This initiation
method should be easier than child support order establishment, because the
obligation is incurred universally rather than at the election of the custodial
parent.
States can choose to allow the child and his non-incarcerated guardian to
opt out of the insurance system, but this decision should happen with
counseling and full information. While it is possible to imagine why individual
families may find this program unpalatable, it is important that adults'
preferences about burdening each other and the state do not create detrimental
results for children.
2. Medium of Payment
The child and her caretaker should receive the proceeds of the insurance in
the form of cash rather than in-kind payments or vouchers. Cash's critical
advantage in an effective insurance program lies in its fungibility and that its
effects can be felt immediately. Because incarcerated parents may have
occupied any number of contributory roles prior to incarceration, it is difficult
to provide any uniform in-kind payment scheme that would plug the loss in
contribution effectively for children. For example, a nonresident noncustodial
father could have contributed to the child's welfare primarily through providing
childcare while the resident custodial mother worked. For this child, an in-kind
payment that would plug the loss that results from that father getting
incarcerated would be childcare. However, another child may have received
mostly supplemental contributions from her father in the form of baby formula
and other foodstuffs. For this child, the relevant plug payment would be food
stamps. Without knowing the individual circumstance of each parent's
contribution prior to incarceration, it is hard to know the form in which the loss
of the parent confers disadvantage on the child.
Furthermore, children's developmental needs change over time, and any
in-kind payment that could be critical at time X may become unimportant
relative to other needs at time Y. While cash supports do not plug the loss
created by departure of a caretaker, it makes the most sense as the next best
alternative because of its fungibility and its ability to provide relief
immediately upon receipt and in almost all contexts.
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3. Amount of Support
There are several models for determining how much the program should
pay to children. One policy permutation is to provide the same amount for all
children, and others would adjust the amount based on a number of factors. The
latter has options that are more progressive (i.e. based on existing family
income) and others that are more regressive (i.e. based on how much support
the parent gave before).
A static payment is the approach taken by Garfinkel in establishing the
CSAS program, which proposed a $2,000 to $2,500 universal, non-income-
tested government guarantee (in 1992 dollars) that "represents less than the cost
of raising a child, so it still leaves an incentive for the recipient parent to work,
but, when combined with earnings and other benefits, it could substantially
reduce poverty and insecurity at practically no cost to the public."324 A similar
methodology could be used to come up with a figure for the instant proposal:
for example, using average child support orders as a guideline, or the average
amount provided for child recipients of Social Security survivor benefits, which
was $625 per month at the end of 2004.325
Alternatively, the program could use a variable payment scheme. One way
is to ride on the coattails of the child support enforcement program to
determine amounts. However, because at least some portion of children whose
parents get incarcerated already have established orders, the amount to be paid
already has a prior basis. For children who do not have child support orders for
the incarcerated parent--either because none was established, or because the
parents were cohabiting or married prior to incarceration-an alternate
mechanism could be established. For example, a family court could come up
with a baseline amount. Alternatively, a state agency could use the state court's
child support order calculator to determine a fallback figure.
Because child support is based partly on how much the nonresident parent
is able to make, it is regressive as a policy: children with nonresident parents
who are richer get more money than children with poor parents (and when the
nonresident parent is poor, the resident parent is likely to be poor as well). In
addition, payment received from child support count against TANF benefits,
which is also regressive.326 One program option is for incarceration insurance
324. GARFINKEL, supra note 24, at 47. He calculates that he next two additional children would
require $1,000 more each, and subsequent children would require $500 each. Id.
325. KATHLEEN RoMIG & SCOTT SZYMENDERA, CONG. RES. SERV., RS22294, SOCIAL SECURITY
SURVIVORS BENEFITS 3 (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/
bitstreams/4244.pdf.
326. Child support payments count against TANF cash benefits, unless the state opts to pass
through the child support benefit and disregard the amount in calculating TANF benefits. Not all states
choose to do so, and many states only do so up to $50. Thus, for many poor families, child support
orders do not help much with bolstering income. For a survey of state pass-through and disregard
policies, see NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., STATE POLICIES REGARDING PASS-THROUGH AND
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to pass payments to the child. This is controversial because there is a strong
state interest in recouping costs. However, providing actual tangible benefits to
children regardless of the actions of their parents is a motivator behind the
proposal, so it behooves policymakers to seriously consider detaching
payments to children from their parents' TANF status.
Finally, there are options to time-limit and/or dollar-limit the insurance,
both in terms of how much children receive and in terms of how much the state
asks parents to pay back. In theory, children should receive these benefits for as
long as they are children. To the extent that hese policy choices are infeasible,
there may need to be adjustments to ensure some support as opposed to none at
all.
4. Accruing Obligations Against the Parent
The most direct scheme would be to put the incarcerated parent on the
hook for the full amount paid to the child while the parent is in prison. There
are a few alternative methods of setting up the parental obligation component.
One is to cap the amount owed. Another is to obligate the parent to pay only a
percentage, with the exact amount set at the would-be insurance premium for a
theoretical open market for incarceration insurance.
The state may want to consider these alternatives in light of the many
difficulties in the current child support payback scheme for incarcerated
parents. In the status quo, incarcerated parents often accrue far too much child
support arrears while in prison, and given the host of employment and earnings
327barriers post-release, are unable to pay them back. As a result, arrears build
up, further crippling these parents' abilities to become reintegrated into their
328family lives and parental roles. These policies do not only exacerbate the
disadvantage felt by formerly incarcerated parents, but also harm children by
preventing their parents from reintegrating and becoming able to contribute
meaningfully and continuously to the children's well-being. There is a real
concern that once they get out of prison, felons may be incentivized not to find
a job or find a job in the underground market to avoid wage garnishment. As
the reality of arrears debt sinks in, they may be even less inclined to take on
employment. 329 This might be mitigated through careful programming.
DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES RECEIVING TANF-
FUNDED CASH ASSISTANCE (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-
services/state-policy-pass-through-disregard-child support.aspx.
327. See supra Part ll.B.2.
328. Child support arrears total $110 billion nationally. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FY 2011 PRELIMINARY REPORT (2012), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/prograins/css/resource/fy201 l-preliminary-report.
329. See Marcia Cancian, Carolyn Heinrich & Yiyoon Chung, Does Debt Discourage Employment
and Payment of Child Support?: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (University of Wisconsin Institute
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One option is to delay the onset of the debt. Even if the total amount
accrued against the parent remains the same, the state should consider a
deferred payment system whereby the parent need not begin paying until six
months after employment. This way, the immediate marginal withholdings rate
on these individuals would not be astronomically high, and would counter the
current disincentives for lawful employment.
Another option is to implement programs to keep parents in the gambit of
contributing when they can rather than dropping out entirely. In the child
support context, there have been innovations in some localities to encourage
low-income parents to meet their child support obligations through incentive
programs. For example, Baltimore's child support organizations implemented a
"Help Us Help You" program, which had incentive arrangements for
delinquent payers to make one-time good-faith payments of $20-25, after
which they would be re-issued the driver's license that had been previously
confiscated due to nonpayment, and receive intensive employment placement
and retention programs. 330
Another important policy maneuver that states should seriously consider is
to find ways to avoid penalizing previously incarcerated parents who cannot
work because they must take care of their children instead. One obvious
solution is to credit caretaking against the accrued parental payment amount
(whether the care is for the child insured against during incarceration or a new
child). Another option is to provide a "leave" model for caretaking such that if
the parent does take time off from a paid position for family care (or for
disability), the accrued amount would be frozen and no additional penalties
would be levied. These policies are desirable, out of fairness considerations for
parents with childcare responsibilities, equality-based concerns about gender
roles, and concern for child well-being, since putting a heavy burden on parents
to work at the expense of caring for their children post-incarceration could be
actually detrimental to child well-being.
Finally, as a general matter, the enforcement regime for collecting back-
payment for incarceration insurance should not be draconian. A system tailored
to the efforts and circumstances of the formerly incarcerated parent will be
more beneficial in the long run for their ability to continue contributing to his
child's welfare. Thus, best practices in the child support context for arrears
forgiveness and reasonable evaluations of inability to pay should be a part of
this program as well.
for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper no. 1366-09, July 2009), at 20-26, available at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irpweb/publications/dps/pdfs/dpl 36609.pdf.
330. The success of these programs is hard to measure, as many individuals failed to follow
through with the entire program. See Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement Section 1115
Demonstration Grant, Excellence through Evaluation: Final Report (2012) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Excellence through Evaluation].
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5. Increasing Opportunities for Contributing
The state has not made great strides in increasing employment
opportunities for former inmates, and should improve in this area. Specifically,
the state should continue to bolster investment in education and training
opportunities for formerly incarcerated men, and should consider removing
civil regulatory barriers to certain employment sectors, public benefits, and
housing wherever it is safe to do so.
A final, more radical consideration may be to allow currently-incarcerated
parents to work in prison for "wages," which would reduce the amount of
incarceration insurance payment owed, or bolster the payment to their children.
In the status quo, prison labor is a vast apparatus that pays inmates a minimal
amount in commissary accounts. Some scholars and practitioners advocate
eliminating prison labor or increasing the amount prisoners get paid in their
cash commissary accounts. Alternatively, perhaps inmates could opt to get paid
in deductions in the total amount owed for their children's incarceration
insurance, or to increase the total amount of incarceration insurance paid to
their children, in lieu of being paid in their commissaries. The rate of deduction
should be higher than that of the low-wage commissary payments, in order to
incentivize opting into this program.
This plan would have several benefits. First, it would allow inmates to
reduce the future burden of arrears post-release. Second, it would allow inmates
to contribute if they think their children and children's caregivers need more
resources than provided by the insurance. Third, it would create a constant
linkage option for inmates to their children. The inmate parent would be able to
make autonomous decisions about whether and how to provide for their
children while in prison, possibly counteracting some of the alienation and
detachment effects on parenting identity.
Another potential program is for the released inmate to opt into a
transitional "work probation" period, whereby the ex-felon is still restricted in
many ways: he would work in jobs mandated by the government, until he pays
off the entirety of or a large percentage of the accrued amount. This would
create the added benefit of developing work skills for eventual reintegration,
but would also create additional opportunities for paying back.
6. Transparency
If state, regional, or federal governments implement this proposal, one
interesting policy maneuver to promote awareness and to manage costs is to
publicize the amount of money being spent on this program as a percentage of
the total prison budget. This serves two purposes. First and most importantly,
by publicizing the cost, the state is recognizing-and making the public
recognize-that there are indeed collateral costs of mass incarceration.
[Vol. 26:1
2014] Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk 155
Publishing the cost of this program as a percentage of the prison budget
reminds the public that this program is linked to the regime of incarceration
rather than the regime of entitlement programs. This is an important distinction
because it forces the recognition that incarceration policy is a choice and that
the choice creates collateral consequences. Especially given that these collateral
consequences have been hidden in the past, transparency promotes awareness.
Second, publicizing the cost is also a good checking mechanism, and may
allow the program to gain support from budget conservatives who are worried
about cost ballooning.
D. Limitations and Caveats
This proposal does not create a perfect solution. Nevertheless, it addresses
a major risk in the lives of many children-many of whom are already
especially vulnerable. Its implementation will almost certainly create dilemmas
for the implementer. I examine some grounds for hesitation below, accepting
some as obvious but nonfatal flaws and countering others as minor or
misconceived. This is by no means a comprehensive list, and some of the
potential counterarguments are already anticipated in subparts above, but in
sum, I aim to address the most pressing contentions.
1. Many Ex-Inmate Parents Cannot or Will Not Pay
This argument expresses the concern that because many ex-felons cannot
find adequate employment, and because some will repudiate the obligation to
pay, there is a good chance that some ex-inmate parents will not pay the full
amount owed to the government for the subsidy to their children. This may be
especially true if they have accrued a large amount by virtue of long sentences
or if they have multiple children.
But insofar as the government has an obligation to provide for these
children when parental incarceration occurs, the state has an obligation to pay
the price of upholding that obligation, regardless of whether a particular parent
can pay the state back. Thus, the fact that the full amount may not be recouped
is not fatal to the internal logic of the proposal.33' Indeed, I propose this plan
with the full understanding that the government would likely not recoup the full
costs from the parent after incarceration.
In fact, that non-payment risk exists is a structural component of the
proposal itself. This creates an incentive for the state to provide better reentry
331. The fact that the full amount may not be recouped would mean that some of the benefits
outlined in Part [V.B.2-about the potential of the incarceration insurance program to counter parental
alienation-would be slightly diminished, only to the extent that some portion of parents realize while in
prison that they cannot pay their share.
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
policies for ex-felons. This may seem counterintuitive, but the proposal
reframes mass incarceration as a state policy: if the state has something direct
to gain from making sure ex-felons find employment, it may be better
incentivized to improve opportunities for transitional jobs, housing, drug
treatment, and other comprehensive reintegration provisions. 332 Alternatively,
if it has something to gain from reducing the number of children to whom it
must pay incarceration insurance, the state has an incentive to reduce the
number of parents going to prison in the first place.
For the parent committed to prison for life or for long periods of time, there
is no feasible way to pay back the government. Above, I discussed the
possibility designing a prison-work system where the parent could work to pay
into the insurance scheme. However, the effectiveness of this proposal is still
limited. These are fringe cases that the proposal will not be able to address.
Similarly, as a growing number of federal crimes are for immigration offenses
where parent inmates are deported upon completion of their sentences, it is not
clear how the state could enforce their contributions. For all of these concerns,
the bottom line is that though the parent may be unable to complete his end of
the obligation, that does not free the state to ignore its obligation, which it can
and should fulfill.
Therefore, though theoretically the proposal works best when the
government provides the upfront outlay and the parent eventually pays back,
the success of the program as a policy tool does not rely on repayment. Rather,
the proposal reframes the repayment issue as a dynamic one and leaves it to the
government to decide where to focus its energies in terms of recuperating costs.
2. Incentives To Go To Prison?
Another counterargument is that by providing for their children,
incarceration insurance actually confers a benefit on felons. This is a very
important concern. First, as a normative and common-sense matter, decreasing
the deterrence effect of prison is bad for law enforcement. Second, it is
inequitable to create a policy that confers a benefit for lawbreakers in
comparison to those who did not break the law.
However, this policy is unlikely to give people an incentive to go to prison.
First, under this proposal, once the incarcerated parent leaves prison, they
eventually have to pay the government back. Second, as the analysis in Part
II.B explained, a criminal record reduces earnings potential dramatically, and
individuals cannot stand to gain in the long term from going to prison even with
this marginal benefit to their children in the short run.
332. See Western, supra note 21.
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3. Noneconomic Harms
Incarceration insurance is not designed to directly alleviate noneconomic
harms visited up on children by parental incarceration. Although financial
support might assuage some of the negative consequences that come as a result
of second-order effects of economic hardship caused by parental incarceration,
it will not necessarily have much of an impact on the emotional and
developmental harms caused by the traumatic event of parental exit through
incarceration. Other policies aimed at more humane arrest procedures,
improving placement and visitation, and providing inmates with meaningful
opportunities to interact with their children remotely could help. But ultimately,
tragically, there may be nothing that can truly soften the blow of seeing a
parent committed to prison. There may be nothing that can really heal the
child's heartbreak from prolonged periods apart from his parent. But
incarceration insurance is unlikely to aggravate these fundamental problems of
forced familial separation; instead, it can help ease the holistic burden on
families and children by providing support where it can.
4. Under-inclusiveness
Others may question why children whose parents get incarcerated should
receive extra funds while children of ordinarily neglectful parents do not. But
parental incarceration is unique both because, save death or severe disability, it
is the most totalizing incapacitation of a parent's ability to provide resources to
his children, and because this incapacitation is imposed by the state.
Evidence suggests the harm of incarceration on children may be greater
than mere absence of support.333 Thus, on a comparative level, children of
incarcerated parents on average may still be worse off than similarly situated
peers, even if they do receive this insurance. Indeed, when parents leave their
children through other exits, the state expects the exiting parents to continue to
fulfill parental duties. Of course, the government does not always do a
particularly good job of enforcing that expectation, and preferences certain
forms of exit over others.334 But the instant proposal addresses the
circumstance when the parental duty literally cannot be fulfilled because the
government imposes the barrier.
333. Seesupra Part II.A.
334. For example, the state makes implied and explicit distinctions between the death of a working
parent (Social Security) and having a nonresident parent. See Dorothy Roberts, The Absent Black
Father, in LOST FATHERS 45, 53 (Cynthia Daniels ed., 1998) (arguing that the state makes a distinction
"between children whose mothers become widowed and children whose mothers never marry or get
divorced. The former are not stigmatized at all and receive survivors' benefits through Social Security-
the most generous type of public assistance paid to mothers. The latter are more likely to receive
[welfare] ... benefits, which are both disparaged and meager.").
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In the end, there may be cases where the children of incarcerated parents
under this system are better provided for than the children of deadbeat
noncustodial parents under this scheme. In practice, under-inclusiveness is a
harm we may have to accept. Though good policy designs should try to
minimize it, the problem posed is not inherent to the status of the recipients of
incarceration insurance. Instead, if the state also ramped up child support
enforcement and employment opportunities in general, it would alleviate the
comparative disparity. Indeed, virtually all child welfare programs suffer from
the same problem. For example, survivor benefits are under-inclusive and
create a comparative advantage for children with dead parents, but that is not
considered a good reason for denying them those benefits.
E. Buying In
The proposal for incarceration insurance is novel, but it is not wholly
liberal or conservative. Novelty also has drawbacks. Implementing a program
such as this one requires attention to how stakeholders might react. There are
two parallel concerns about "buy-in": on one level, it's the policymakers; on
another, it's the families.
1. Policymakers Buying In
The proposal is driven entirely from the perspective of the child, and this
perspective should be persuasive to points along the political spectrum. All
constituencies-at least in theory-should consider persuasive the three
theoretical underpinnings described in Part III, but different parts may appeal to
some more forcefully. Political liberals will likely agree with the focus on
underprivileged families and the government's obligation to correct past
wrongs. Though they may prefer a more universal assurance system, this
proposal does not foreclose those options. Conservatives may find this proposal
attractive because it aligns with the responsible fatherhood movement,335 and
the potential for the program as an investment to reduce the collective societal
costs of parental incarceration and childhood disadvantage. Though they may
have budget concerns, the proposal focuses on both on bolstering child welfare
and keeping parents accountable. Libertarians may find persuasive the
arguments about negative externalities and shoring up parental responsibility,
and perhaps see the program as a way for the state to recalibrate its own
interference in social control.
Ultimately, the path towards implementation will likely involve trade-offs.
The previous subsections delineate some of those options, and ultimately, these
335. See generally ANNA GAVANAS, FATHERHOOD POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES:
MASCULINITY, SEXUALITY, RACE, AND MARRIAGE (2004).
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options will adjust to the political realities. For example, the question of just
how much the state should ask from the parent in the post-release payback
system and whether the payments will count against TANF benefits will
depend on what various policymakers are comfortable with. They must balance
the commitment to alleviating bad outcomes for families with the commitment
to responsible parenthood and budgetary realities.
Some scholars believe that social insurance is viewed by the American
public as more acceptable than "entitlement" programs.336 However, more
nuanced analyses of support for public programs suggests the divide is not as
simple as universal versus categorical. Martin Gilen's research on support for
universal and means-tested programs demonstrates that both the poor and
nonpoor public generally have consistently higher levels of support for non-
welfare programs, whether universal or categorical. Support for welfare is
lower generally, and declines as income goes up.337 Robert Greenstein points
out that some means-tested programs in a relatively benefits-hostile period-
the Reagan Administration-actually were preserved or expanded while
338universal programs were cut.
Regardless of historical public opinion tendencies, categorical eligibility
for specific programs does often spark suspicion about deservingness, whereas
programs that insure against unknown risks are less likely to invite such
suspicion. However, incarceration insurance does not share some of social
insurance's politically palatable traits. Because "social insurance programs
engage most of the electorate precisely because they cover common risks and
insure most of the population ... [a]nd because practically everyone is both a
contributor and a potential beneficiary, the politics of social insurance tends to
be of the 'us-us' rather than 'us-them' form." 339 However, even though in
reality the advent of parental incarceration is something that can happen to any
child, the American public is not likely to start thinking of themselves as in the
same group as families with incarcerated parents. Indeed, opposition to broad
social insurance schemes for children hews along the line of the argument that
children are blameless and deserving, but they are tied to parents who may not
be. 340 For children, "the risk to be insured against is the risk of being born into
and raised in a poor household . . . Because the family is an economic unit,
society cannot lift the poor child from poverty without making the family non-
336. See Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 432-33
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds. 1991) (arguing that universal programs receive more
support as the public believes they have a "direct stake" in these programs).
337. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 54 (1999).
338. Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative
View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 336, at 437.
339. MARMOR, MASHAW & PAKUTKA, supra note 22, at 219.
340. Linda Gordon, Who Deserves Help? Who Must Provide? 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 12, 22 (2001).
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poor."341 There is a fear that parents will free-ride on the moral deserts of their
children. 342
Thus, it is extremely important that in designing a policy for incarceration
insurance, policymakers emphasize the perspective of the child as the unit of
analysis and the direct beneficiary. Social insurance for children may avoid the
problem of deservingness suspicion if decision makers focus on the fact that
"children's actions are not implicated in their poverty."343 An important policy
factor is to ensure that the program does not act to disincentivize work.344 This
program in particular can accomplish that precisely because parents are
obligated to pay back. Thus, though the proposal is not nearly as "ambitious" in
its reach as some of the broader proposals for social insurance for children, its
targeted nature is actually advantageous from a theoretical and a political
perspective.
By concentrating on a specific trigger for childhood disadvantage,
incarceration insurance is more limited in scope and expense than a more
universal program; this may make it more politically viable. Gillian Lester
argues that voters and decision makers use a trio of factors to decide if they
support redistribution: reciprocity, empathy/groupism, altruism, and beliefs
about deservingness.345 The general reforms targeted at mass incarceration,
while probably astute and just, are prime candidates for failing the above
factors because the primary beneficiaries of the policy are felons or potential
felons. Voters do not think of decriminalization efforts as public goods that
create reciprocal benefits, nor do they think of themselves as falling within the
same "group" as felons and potential felons, nor do they believe that these folks
deserve any benefits. At first glance, the proposal for incarceration insurance
may seem at risk to trigger many of the same "otherness" problems. It does not
appear that the general public is "in this together" as Lester puts it-after all,
most people are not children of felons. However, because the proposal focuses
on "deserving" recipients, it may (justifiably) pass muster. Lester points out
that "in dictator games, proposers give about three times as much when they are
told the recipient is the American Red Cross than when the subject is
anonymous," noting that various studies show "people express stronger support
for redistribution if they believe the recipient's need is caused by circumstances
341. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 119.
342. This fear is overstated for several reasons, most obviously because it starts with a baseline
assumption that parents ought not receive assistance from the state in caring for their children. See
FINEMAN, supra note 210, at 42-49. Further, the stark gender disparities in parental care-and the
resulting relative poverty of single mothers-demonstrate that the "free rider" fear is not nuanced
enough.
343. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 23, at 120.
344. FINEMAN, supra note 210, at 42-49.
345. Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? Law, Social Preferences, and
Sustainable Policy Design, 64 TAx L. REV. 313, 340-50 (2011).
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beyond his or her control. 346 That children cannot control whether their
parents go to prison is both normatively important and could be critical for
coalescing support. If appropriately framed, policies directed solely at child
welfare might be more likely to succeed than other entitlement and
redistribution policies.347 The moral imagination of the political process may be
lacking in many respects, but it might be more robust when considering the
welfare and just deserts of underprivileged children.
2. Families Buying In
Second, and as importantly, is buy-in on the proposal from the perspective
of inmates and their families. This program makes major demands of these
parties: it requires that an already-disadvantaged individual pay back the
government at a vulnerable transition point in his life. It is situated within a
regime that has-not unreasonably-bred a high level of mistrust among poor
communities. "In high-incarceration neighborhoods, many residents do not
believe that the state's justice agencies work on their behalf."348 A recent study
found that "neighborhoods with relatively large concentrations of former
prisoners" had more negative attitudes about the role of authority and
legitimacy of the law.34 9 Because incarceration insurance r sts against a
backdrop of existing suspicion, it is likely to face legitimacy problems.
Poor families have reason to be skeptical and apprehensive. Inmates may
feel overburdened, or that they are being treated as "mere paychecks."
350
However, on the whole, these demands are far less demanding than the status
quo, where child support arrears accrue against the incarcerated parent without
a cent going to their children. Nevertheless, practitioners hould pay careful
attention to explaining the underlying rationale for the incarceration insurance
program. First, they should spell out upfront specifically what is required of the
incarcerated parent and how he may achieve those requirements. Thus, these
efforts may parallel similar ones in the child support context, where there is a
dual effort for "requiring poor noncustodial fathers to be more reliable child
support providers" and for "enabling such fathers to meet their responsibilities
permanently, e.g. avoiding arrears."35 1 This enterprise, called "managing the
risk," involved efforts to "help [noncustodial parents] find[] good jobs ...
enroll[] in peer-based fatherhood programs and . . . be[] more effective at
346. Id. at 347.
347. Lester uses empirical research to explain the factor of deservingness in the abstract, but it is
difficult to know how this plays out in real life. Id.
348. CLEAR, supra note 8, at 112.
349. See id. at 113 (citing Robert D. Crutchfield, Neighborhoods, Collective Efficacy, and Inmate
Release: A summary of Preliminary Analyses. Unpublished paper (2005)). See generally Tom R. Tyler,
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006).
350. See EDIN & NELSON, supra note 83, at 118.
351. Excellence through Evaluation, supra note 330, at 7.
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staying on top of child support obligations and tell[ing] child support systems
when their cases needed modification.
'" 352
Second, packaging the program with a bundle of other ways of connecting
the inmate with the child, such as visitation programs, parenting classes, and
other reforms, would help situate incarceration insurance as one of a set of
policies directed at preserving parenthood bonds, as opposed to one that milks
the inmate of resources once he gets out. These efforts are necessary not just
for the sake of abstract legitimacy, but also for sustaining and encouraging
long-term parental contributions to their children's well-being.
VI. CONCLUSION
That so many children suffer incarceration risk in America is a catastrophe
of massive proportions. This is not to say that any individual parent did not
deserve to go to prison, or that incarceration is the only factor driving economic
instability for their children. However, the major effect of mass incarceration is
the exacerbation of childhood disadvantage through deprivation f resources in
parental incapacitation. The status quo writes off incarcerated parents. In doing
so, it also writes off their children.
In our society, parents are responsible for supporting their children,
through physical care, financial assistance, and emotional support. Many fail
their responsibilities for a number of reasons, but one of the biggest structural
impetuses driving out parents is the American prison, a "system of social
control unparalleled in world history," removing millions of parents and
barring them from supporting their children.353 As a result, children bear the
cost of society's expressed interest-justified or not-in mass incarceration.
Incarceration insurance, like virtually all other reactive proposals, will not
solve the mass incarceration problem.354 It is a move to address some of its
particularly pernicious consequences. It alone cannot solve for many of the
other deep problems, such as racism in policing, felon disenfranchisement, and
the failure to reintegrate former felons into society. It thus should not distract
from the agenda to reverse the pervasive social injustice disaster that is the
American penal system. Large-scale recognition of mass incarceration as a
man-made social disaster is underway, and this proposal helps raise awareness
of one type of consequence arising from it. However, it is by no means an
effort to displace other reform projects targeted at addressing similar
consequences, such as quests to get judges to consider parental status at
sentencing and to get prisoners allocated to locations closer to their families.
352. Id.
353. ALEXANDER, supra note 28 at 8.
354. See CLEAR, supra note 8, at 181 (noting that rehabilitation programs, alternatives to
incarceration, and reentry programs are good efforts, but will not solve mass incarceration).
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Nor should scholars and policymakers bank on the possibility that the U.S.
will successfully walk back mass incarceration policy.355 It is possible that "the
punitive apparatus of criminal justice, with its guarantee of continuing
collateral damage, continues unabated.,356 In the meantime, children continue
to suffer the negative externalities of the state's grand social experiment. There
is an urgent need for society to make good on its obligation to compensate
these children, who neither chose to be born to parents who will go to prison,
nor chose the policies that brought so many of their parents there, and for so
long, in the first place. However, incarceration insurance could be a powerful
tool to drive a wedge between the existing advent of mass incarceration for
adults and the subsequent catastrophic consequences for their children.
Intentionally or not, the American criminal system is "eroding the fabric of
family life in poor minority communities."357 Insofar as financial assistance
stanches the most direct outflows of harm from incarceration for inmates'
children, it is an important policy mechanism for promoting the well-being of
this vulnerable population. The proposal for incarceration insurance aims to
resolve a dilemma that is currently wholly unaddressed and that confers very
real, severe, and negative consequences for children.
The foundation of American democratic governance lies in equality of
opportunity; a foundation of our moral imperative is to provide for children in
need. At this moment, vast numbers of American children are in need because
the criminal justice system has left them behind. American children need and
deserve incarceration insurance. Without it, they unjustly suffer silently as the
ignored, uncompensated victims of private tragedies and public policy.
355. For discussion on the status of these reforms, see, e.g., CLEAR, supra note 8, at 177; David
Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration? 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 33, 37-39 (2011).
356. CLEAR, supra note 8, at 208.
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